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ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY: A NEW
INSOLVENCY REGIME TO ADDRESS SYSTEMIC RISK
Hollace T. Cohen *
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act") was enacted on July 21, 2010.1 A key
element of the Dodd-Frank Act is Title II, entitled Orderly Liqui-
dation Authority.2 Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act is a new insol-
vency regime intended to end "too big to fail" bailouts by provid-
ing the United States government with the ability to appoint the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC") as receiver
to administer the orderly liquidation of a nonbank financial com-
pany or bank holding company whose failure presents systemic
risk to the financial stability of the United States.'
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a process for the liquida-
tion of systemically important nonbank financial companies that
are eligible to be debtors under the United States Bankruptcy
Code4 (the "Bankruptcy Code") that replaces the long-established
* Partner, Troutman Sanders LLP, New York, New York. J.D., New York University.
Ms. Cohen's practice includes the representation of secured and unsecured creditors, in-
cluding lenders, bondholders, indenture trustees, trade creditors, lessors and lessees of
real and personal property, and acquirers of assets in bankruptcy cases and out-of-court
restructurings. Ms. Cohen would like to thank Brett Goodman, who also practices at
Troutman Sanders, for his assistance with this article and Richard Lieb for his insightful
comments.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.).
2. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5381-94 (West 2011).
3. Id. § 5384(a). The types of entities that may be subject to Title II include bank
holding companies, investment banks, insurance companies, and registered securities bro-
ker-dealers. See id. § 5381(a)(7), (11), (13).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 101-1532 (2006). Companies eligible to be debtors under § 109 of
the Bankruptcy Code may be liquidated under Chapter 7, id. §§ 701-784, or reorganized
or liquidated under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, id. §§ 1101-1174. As discussed
below, certain provisions of Title II also apply to the orderly liquidation of registered bro-
ker-dealers that are otherwise subject to liquidation under the Securities Investor Protec-
tion Act ("SIPA") and to insurance companies that are subject to applicable state insur-
ance insolvency laws. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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means for the liquidation of such companies under Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code., As discussed herein, liqui-
dation under Title II is a game changer for the creditors and equi-
ty security holders of the financial company, as well as for other
interested parties and the covered financial company itself.6 The
rights of creditors, equity security holders, and counterparties of
the covered financial company vary significantly from those un-
der the Bankruptcy Code.7 Because of the basic differences of the
Title II regime as compared with the provisions of the Bankrupt-
cy Code, those who enter into credit arrangements or other con-
tractual relationships with a financial company should be aware
that, if at some time in the future a determination is made to ap-
point the FDIC as receiver for the financial company, they will
enjoy different, and in some cases substantially lesser, rights
than if the liquidation were to proceed under the Bankruptcy
Code.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted against the back-
drop of, among other things, the events of September 2008, when
the federal government faced concerns over the potential disrup-
tion of the stability of the United States financial system as a re-
sult of the financial condition of such institutions as Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. ("Lehman"); its wholly owned broker-
dealer subsidiary, Lehman Brothers, Inc. ("LBI"); and American
International Group, Inc. ("AIG").8 The United States government
made the decision not to bail out either Lehman or LBI.9 As a re-
sult, Lehman and certain of its subsidiaries commenced proceed-
ings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 15,
2008,1o and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
5. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (regarding Chapter 7 liquidation); id. §§ 1101-1174 (re-
garding Chapter 11 reorganization).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part VIII.
8. See Examining the Causes of the Current Financial and Economic Crisis of the
United States and of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers: Hearing Before the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission (2010) (statement of Harvey Miller, Senior Partner, Weil, Gotshal &
Manges, LLP) [hereinafter Testimony of Harvey Miller]; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE
OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON THE MARKETS, AND THE
GOVERNMENT'S ExIT STRATEGY 7 (2010).
9. See Testimony of Harvey Miller, supra note 8, at 7. More than a year earlier, in
June of 2007, the decision was made to bail out Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. and its broker-
dealer subsidiary due to concerns over the effect that proceedings under existing insolven-
cy regimes might have on the United States financial system. Id. at 17.
10. Id. at 2.
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("SIPC") commenced a proceeding for the liquidation of LBI under
the Securities Investor Protection Act ("SIPA")" on September 19,
2008.12
Conversely, only a few days after the filing of the Chapter 11
cases of Lehman and certain debtor affiliates (the "Lehman Cas-
es")," the United States government "bailed out" AIG because it
was perceived as "too big to fail." 4 The United States government
initially invested $80 billion in AIG and, in the end, a total of
more than $100 billion through a loan from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York and funds provided by the United States De-
partment of the Treasury (the "Treasury").' In return, the Trea-
sury received more than ninety percent of the equity of AIG in the
form of shares of AIG preferred stock that were convertible into
AIG common stock.'6
The filing of the Lehman Cases-followed shortly thereafter by
the commencement of "approximately 80 insolvency proceedings
affecting Lehman subsidiaries and affiliates .. . in 18 foreign
countries"-had a profoundly disruptive effect on financial mar-
kets." The crisis of confidence in United States financial markets
resulted in illiquidity for many banks and other financial compa-
nies that were already suffering from significant potential losses
with respect to, among other things, mortgage loans and securi-
tized real estate investments. For example, on September 25,
2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision announced the seizure of
the largest savings bank in the United States, Washington Mu-
tual Bank.'8 Washington Mutual Bank was placed into FDIC re-
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-111 (2006).
12. Testimony of Harvey Miller, supra note 8, at 13-14.
13. Voluntary Petition, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008), ECF No. 1.
14. See Testimony of Harvey Miller, supra note 8, at 16, 19.
15. Id. at 19.
16. Andrew R. Sorkin, Breaking Even on A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at Bi. The
Chief Restructuring Officer at the Treasury then projected that as a result of sales of as-
sets and the conversion of AIG preferred stock issued into shares of AIG common stock,
followed by sales of common stock over time, the federal government may ultimately re-
coup its entire investment in AIG. Id.
17. See Testimony of Harvey Miller, supra note 8, at 12-13. Additional United States
subsidiaries and affiliates of Lehman filed for proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code after September 15, 2008. See id.
18. Press Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, Washington Mutual Acquired by
JPMorgan Chase (Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter OTS Press Release]; see also Examining the
Causes of the Current Financial and Economic Crisis of the United States and of the Col-
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ceivership and then sold to JPMorgan Chase for approximately
$1.9 billion.'9 Washington Mutual, Inc., the parent holding com-
pany of Washington Mutual Bank, then filed for proceedings un-
der Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 26, 2008.20
Following the events of September 2008 that caused a down-
ward turn in financial markets, the debt and equity markets also
became concerned over the financial condition of Wachovia Cor-
poration ("Wachovia").1 As a result of Wachovia's inability to
raise capital and impending loss of liquidity, Wachovia entered
into discussions with Citigroup, Inc. ("Citigroup") and Wells Far-
go & Company ("Wells Fargo") regarding a possible merger.22 As
noted by Robert Steel, the former Chief Executive Officer of Wa-
chovia, "[T]he failure of those negotiations could have resulted in
Wachovia filing for bankruptcy and the national bank being
placed into FDIC receivership."23 In fact, FDIC Chairman Sheila
Bair confirmed to Steel that "Wachovia's [financial] situation
posed a systemic risk to the banking system, and the FDIC was
prepared to exercise its powers under Chapter 13 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act 2 4 [the "FDIA"] to effect an open bank as-
sisted transaction" with Citigroup. 25 However, shortly after Wa-
chovia entered into an agreement in principle with Citigroup for
the acquisition of the national bank, Wells Fargo reassessed the
value of Wachovia and offered to acquire the shares of Wachovia's
common stock for seven dollars per share, thereby obviating the
lapse of Lehman Brothers: Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010)
(statement of Robert K. Steel, former CEO of Wachovia Corp.) [hereinafter Testimony of
Robert Steel].
19. Testimony of Robert Steel, supra note 18; see also OTS Press Release, supra note
18, at 3.
20. Voluntary Petition, In re Washington Mutual, Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del.
Sept. 26, 2008), ECF No. 1; see also Dan Fitzpatrick & Robin Sidel, Crisis on Wall Street:
J.P. Morgan Sweeps WaMu Executive Suite-Many of Top Brass Will Leave Friday; Layoff
News by Dec. 1, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008, at C2.
21. See Sheila C. Bair, Legislative Update: FDIC Chair Describes New Resolution Au-
thority, 29-8 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 72 (2010) [hereinafter Legislative Update] ("[Tihe ra-
pidly deteriorating financial condition of both WaMu and Wachovia was in large part trig-
gered by other high-profile failures, most notably the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.").
22. Testimony of Robert Steel, supra note 18, at 2-3.
23. Id. at 3. Wachovia was the parent of Wachovia Bank, N.A.
24. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835a (2006). Under § 1823 of the FDIA, the FDIC has the
power to assist in the sale of assets of an insured depository institution to another insured
depository institution. Id. § 1823(c).
25. Testimony of Robert Steel, supra note 18, at 4.
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need for a transaction assisted by the FDIC.26 On October 3, 2008,
Wells Fargo announced its merger with Wachovia.17
Many other banks and nonbank financial companies were im-
pacted by the financial crisis. To stem the financial crisis and
bring stability to the financial system, Congress enacted the
Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") on October 3, 2008,2
which allowed the Treasury to purchase or insure up to $700 bil-
lion of "troubled assets" of banks, bank holding companies, and
auto companies.29 Ultimately, $386.4 billion of the TARP funds
were used to provide liquidity to numerous financial and automo-
tive companies.30
Following these events, the prevailing perception of the public
and certain regulators was that the use of federal funds to "bail
out" systemically important financial companies in order to keep
those companies from undermining the financial stability of the
United States economy unfairly transferred the risk of the loans
and equity interests of the creditors and shareholders of troubled
financial companies to taxpayers." Moreover, some expressed
concerns that the expectation of bailouts of entities deemed "too
big to fail" led to moral hazard.3 2 Financial companies deemed
26. See id. at 4-5.
27. News Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo, Wachovia Agree to Merge (Oct. 3, 2008),
https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2008/20081003_Wachovia; see also Testimony of Robert
Steel, supra note 18, at 6.
28. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 101-136,
122 Stat. 3765, 3767-800 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211-41 (2006 & Supp. III
2009)).
29. Id. § 101(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3767 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)(1)).
30. Deborah Soloman, A Bank Bailout Some Won't Exit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2010,
at C1 (reporting that "of the $386.4 billion [of TARP funds] the Treasury invested, about
$199 billion already had been repaid" and that the "Congressional Budget Office estimates
that TARP will ultimately cost $66 billion, while the Treasury estimates about $105 bil-
lion"). According to some governmental officials, "the U.S. may ultimately make money on
its AIG investment." Id. On the other hand, "[m]any of the 600 remaining banks [that re-
ceived TARP funds] are still too weak to repay the U.S." Id.; see also, Randall Smith et al.,
U.S.'s Citi Profit: $12 Billion-Treasury Sells Last of Common Shares from Bailout, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 7, 2010, at C1 (reporting that the federal government realized "a profit of $12
billion" on an investment of $45 billion through a public offering of the shares of common
stock received by the federal government in connection with its loan to Citigroup).
31. Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Daniel
Tarullo, Federal Reserve Board Governor) (testifying that allowing losses to be imposed on
creditors and shareholders "is critical to addressing the too-big-to-fail problem and the re-
sulting moral hazard effect"). This concern is reflected in the purposes of the orderly liqui-
dation authority in § 5384(a). 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384(a) (West 2011). See infra Part I.
32. Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S.
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"too big to fail" were believed to have a competitive advantage
over other financial companies that were not viewed as systemi-
cally important in obtaining funding at a time of financial dis-
tress."
Another prevalent view was that the insolvency regimes avail-
able to resolve large, complex, nonbank financial entities and
bank holding companies were "not designed to protect the stabili-
ty of the [United States] financial system."3 4 The goal, therefore,
was to enact legislation that would provide an alternative to fed-
eral bailouts and a mechanism for the orderly liquidation of sys-
temically important financial companies under a new insolvency
regime that would include many of the features of the FDIA,
which applied exclusively to insured depositary institutions (i.e.,
banks and savings and loans companies).35 While the FDIA al-
lowed the FDIC to place insured depository institutions into re-
ceivership and provide for the orderly liquidation of their assets,
there was no comparable statute for bank holding companies and
nonbank financial companies that were as systemically signifi-
cant as the banks and savings and loan companies subject to the
FDIA.3 6 Unlike insured depository institutions, insurance compa-
nies were subject to insolvency proceedings under state insurance
insolvency laws, registered broker-dealers were subject to pro-
ceedings under SIPA, and other United States companies (includ-
ing the parent holding company of one or more depository institu-
tions and other nonbank financial companies) were eligible to be
a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.37
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 6-7 (2009) (statement of Sheila
Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) [hereinafter July 2009 Bair
Statement].
33. Id. at 13 ("Large firms are able to raise huge amounts of debt and equity and are
given access to the credit markets at favorable terms without consideration of the firm's
risk profile. Investors and creditors believe their exposure is minimal since they also be-
lieve the government will not allow these firms to fail.").
34. Regulating and Resolving Institutions Considered 'Too Big to Fail" Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 52 (2009) (state-
ment of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) [hereinafter
May 2009 Bair Statement].
35. Systemically Important Institutions and the Issue of 'Too Big to Fail": Hearing Be-
fore the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chair-
man, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) [hereinafter 2010 Bair Statement].
36. Id. at 11-15.
37. See Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,174 (pro-
posed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
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Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act thus resulted from the perceived
absence of any insolvency regime capable of handling the com-
plexities of liquidating large nonbank financial companies and
bank holding companies without adversely affecting the stability
of the United States financial system. As described in the April
30, 2010 Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs accompanying the predecessor bill to the Dodd-
Frank Act:
Title II establishes an orderly liquidation authority to give the U.S.
Government a viable alternative to the undesirable choice it faced
during the financial crisis between bankruptcy of a large, complex
financial company that would disrupt markets and damage the
economy, and bailout of such financial company that would expose
taxpayers to losses and undermine market discipline."
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides an alternative regime
to the Bankruptcy Code for "covered financial companies" that
would otherwise be subject to the Bankruptcy Code.3 9 It incorpo-
rates many of the powers of the FDIC found in §§ 11 and 13 of the
FDIA40 but also includes certain provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code in order to provide certain rights afforded to creditors under
the Bankruptcy Code. 41 Title II facilitates a regime which gives
broad authority and discretion to the FDIC, as receiver, to ac-
complish the liquidation of the systemically significant financial
company with minimal involvement or oversight by judicial au-
These disparate insolvency regimes were found to be inadequate to effectively
address the actual or potential failure of a financial company that could ad-
versely affect economic conditions or financial stability in the United States.
In such a case, financial support for the company sometimes was the only vi-
able option available for the Federal government to avoid or mitigate serious
adverse effects on economic conditions and financial stability that could re-
sult from the company's failure.
Id.
38. CHRISTOPHER DODD, THE RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF
2010, S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010).
39. See infra Part II for a discussion of the companies that may be subject to Title II of
the Dodd-Frank Act.
40. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1823 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
41. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5389 (West 2011) ("To the extent possible, the [FDIC] shall seek to
harmonize applicable rules and regulations promulgated under this section with the insol-
vency laws that would otherwise apply to a covered financial company."). Under Title II,
the FDIC may also be appointed a receiver of a "covered broker or dealer" or an "insurance
company" that is determined to be a "covered financial company," so that rule-making
must take into account the applicable insolvency regime whether that be the Bankruptcy
Code, SIPA, or state insurance insolvency laws. Id. §§ 5383(e), 5389. The term "State" is
defined in § 2(16) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Id. § 5301(16).
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thorities. This is in stark contrast to proceedings under Chapter
11 or Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, which require judicial
approval of transactions that are not in the ordinary course of
business of the debtor, such as sales of assets and post-petition
financing of a debtor's operations and administrative expenses.42
Such matters require notice to creditors and other parties in in-
terest and an opportunity for parties in interest to be heard.43
Because most systemically significant entities that might be-
come subject to liquidation under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act
are entities that would otherwise be subject to the Bankruptcy
Code, and because the rights of creditors are significantly more
limited under the orderly liquidation authority, Title II requires
that before the FDIC may be appointed as receiver of a financial
company, a non-judicial evaluation be made as to why a case un-
der the Bankruptcy Code is not appropriate for the financial com-
pany.4 Once a determination is made by the Secretary of the
Treasury (the "Secretary") and the FDIC is appointed as receiver
of a covered financial company, any proceedings under the Bank-
42. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b), 364(b), (d) (2006). In a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code, a trustee will be responsible for the liquidation of the debtor; however, many
large and complex cases that involve the liquidation of the debtor, including that of Enron
Corp. and its affiliated debtors (the "Enron Cases") and the Lehman Cases, were com-
menced as proceedings for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See,
In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008), ECF No.
1; Voluntary Petition, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2001),
ECF No. 1. In both the Enron Cases and the Lehman Cases, the debtors remained in pos-
session in proceedings under Chapter 11 even though assets were being liquidated and
operations were being wound down. In Enron, the bankruptcy court confirmed the debtors'
Fifth Amended Joint Plan of the Affiliated Debtors. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Confirming Supplemental Modified Fifth Amended Joint Plan of Affiliated Debtors
Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and Related Relief, In re
Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2004). Unsecured creditors in those
cases have benefitted from the appointment of a committee of unsecured creditors that
represents the interests of unsecured creditors in such cases. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). The
creditors' committee is empowered under § 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code to, among other
things, "consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the administration of
the case, investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the
debtor [and] the operation of the debtor's business, . . . [and] participate in the formulation
of a plan [of reorganization or liquidation]." Id. § 1103(c)(1)-(3). The unsecured creditors'
committee has the right to be heard on all matters in a case under Chapter 11. Id. § 1109.
43. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b), 364(b), (d) (2006).
44. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5383(a)(2)(F) (West 2011) (setting forth one of the matters to be
covered in the written recommendation required in connection with the determination by
the Secretary of the Treasury to seek the appointment of the FDIC as receiver of a covered
financial company). It would appear that such criterion would not apply to a registered




ruptcy Code will be dismissed and none may be commenced dur-
ing the pendency of receivership under Title II.45
Title II also contains provisions concerning the FDIC's ap-
pointment as receiver of a covered financial company that is a
covered broker or dealer that would be subject to SIPA46 or an in-
surance company that would be subject to state insurance insol-
vency laws .4 However, in the case of a covered broker or dealer or
an insurance company, Title II does not completely supplant the
existing insolvency regime or the authority of the governmental
entity charged with the oversight of such entities. For example, in
the case of a covered broker or dealer, Title II contains provisions
relating to the role of the FDIC as receiver,"5 the appointment of
SIPC as trustee (rather than an individual from the private sec-
tor), 49and modifications of and amendments to discrete provisions
of SIPA and of the Bankruptcy Code that are incorporated by ref-
erence under SIPA.50
The role of the FDIC as receiver is more limited in the case of
the liquidation of a covered financial company that is an insur-
ance company. The appropriate regulator under applicable state
law, rather than by the FDIC, will carry out the liquidation of an
insurance company determined to be a covered financial company
45. Id. § 5388(a). For a discussion concerning the determination required for the ap-
pointment of the FDIC as receiver under § 5383, see infra Part III.
46. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5381(a)(7) (defining a "covered broker or dealer" as a "covered finan-
cial company that is a broker or dealer that (A) is registered with the [SEC] under section
[15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] and (B) is a member of SIPC").
47. Id. § 5381(a)(13) (defining "insurance company" as "any entity that is (A) engaged
in the business of insurance; (B) subject to regulation by a State insurance regulator; and
(C) covered by a State law that is designed to specifically deal with the rehabilitation, li-
quidation, or insolvency of an insurance company").
48. See, e.g., id. § 5385(b).
49. Id. § 5385(a).
50. See, e.g., id. § 5385(b)(1) ("SIPC shall have no powers or duties with respect and
liabilities transferred by the [FDIC] from the covered broker or dealer to any bridge finan-
cial company established in accordance with this title."); id. § 5385(b)(2) (limiting powers
of SIPC, as trustee, so as not to impair or impede exercise of certain powers and duties of
the FDIC, as receiver). "To the extent consistent with [SIPA], a liquidation proceeding
[under SIPA] shall be conducted in accordance with . . . [the provisions] of chapters 1, 3,
and 5 and subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of [the Bankruptcy Code]." 15 U.S.C. § 78fff
(2006). Notwithstanding that fact, the provisions of Title II with respect to qualified finan-
cial contracts (as defined in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(8)) will be governed by 12 U.S.C.A. §
5390, including those relating to the right of the FDIC to repudiate and transfer qualified
financial contracts under § 5390(c), rather than the comparable provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5385(b)(4). The priorities under § 5390(b) of Title II, rather
than § 726 of the Bankruptcy Code, will apply to certain claims. See id. § 5385(g)(2).
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unless such state regulator does not file the appropriate judicial
action under state law within sixty days after designation of the
insurance company or its parent as a covered financial company.5'
In such case, the FDIC has "the authority to stand in the place of"
the State regulator and "file the appropriate judicial action to
place [the insurance] company into orderly liquidation under" ap-
plicable state law. 52
Since most financial companies to which Title II applies would
otherwise be eligible debtors under the Bankruptcy Code, and
since Title II provides a comprehensive alternative insolvency re-
gime for such entities, this article does not consider the modifica-
tions effected by Title II to a SIPA liquidation or an insurance
company insolvency proceeding under state law. Instead, this ar-
ticle focuses on the provisions of Title II applicable to covered fi-
nancial companies that would otherwise be eligible for liquidation
under the Bankruptcy Code.
This article summarizes various key provisions of Title II, in-
cluding determining which entities may become a covered finan-
cial company, the procedures for the appointment of the FDIC as
receiver of a covered financial company, the powers and duties of
the FDIC as receiver, procedures for determining creditor claims,
the priority of distributions, and the manner in which the liquida-
tion of a covered financial company will be funded. This article al-
so considers the potential impact on creditors and other stake-
holders of the broad powers and duties of the FDIC as receiver
and how certain rights, protections, and priorities afforded to
creditors and other stakeholders under Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Act differ from the rights, protections, and priorities provided to
creditors and other stakeholders under the Bankruptcy Code.
This latter comparison is significant to creditors of, and counter-
parties to contracts with, financial companies that now may be
subject to Title II, since those entities entered into agreements
with financial companies prior to the enactment of Title II based
upon their expectation that their rights would be determined un-
der the Bankruptcy Code and the well-developed body of case law
concerning its provisions. It is also important for those entities
that will contract with systemically important nonbank financial
companies in the future to consider the potential impact that a




receivership under Title II would have on their rights as creditors
or counterparties of a covered financial company.
One of the challenging aspects of considering the potential im-
pact of Title II on creditors and other stakeholders of nonbank fi-
nancial companies that are eligible to be a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code is that many provisions of Title II are subject to
the enactment of rules and regulations that are necessary for im-
plementing and clarifying its terms.53 Since most of those regula-
tions have yet to be promulgated, the impact of Title II on credi-
tors and other stakeholders will continue to evolve. It is possible
that many regulations may further "harmonize" certain provi-
sions of Title II with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. It is
also possible that the very significant differences between the
provisions of Title II and those of the Bankruptcy Code will cause
creditors of nonbank financial companies that face future finan-
cial crises to be more amenable to finding private sector alterna-
tives, including restructuring of debt and consent to sales of as-
sets, in order to avoid the uncertainties posed by this new and as
yet untested insolvency regime.
53. Id. § 5389 (granting authority to the FDIC in consultation with the Financial Sta-
bility Oversight Council (the "Council"), formed pursuant to Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act,
to "prescribe such rules and regulations as the [FDIC] considers necessary or appropriate
to implement this [title], including rules and regulations with respect to the rights, inter-
ests, and priorities of creditors, counterparties, security entitlement holders, or other per-
sons with respect to any covered financial company or any assets or other property of or
held by such covered financial company, and address the potential for conflicts of interest
between or among individual receiverships established under this [title] or under the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Act"). There are numerous instances in which the provisions of
Title II call for regulations. For example, the definition of what constitutes a "financial
company" under § 5381(a)(11) is dependent upon regulations to be proposed by the FDIC
in consultation with the Secretary. Id. § 5381(a)(11), (b). In addition, § 5385(h) grants joint
authority to the FDIC and the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"), after
consultation with SIPC, to issue rules to implement § 5385. Id. § 5385(a)-(b), (h); see also
Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,179-80 (proposed
Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) (requesting not only comments to Pro-
posed Rule 380 but also answers to questions seeking to identify topics where additional
regulations would be necessary). The FDIC issued an interim final rule (the "Interim Final
Rule") that made certain modifications to Proposed Rule 380, posed questions and sought
comment with respect to certain aspects of the Interim Final Rule. Orderly Liquidation
Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4214 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380). Additions to
Proposed Rule 380 are set forth in Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324-45
(proposed Mar. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
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I. THE PURPOSE OF THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY FOR
COVERED FINANCIAL COMPANIES
Section 5384(a) outlines the purpose of the orderly liquidation
authority originally enacted in the Dodd-Frank Act as follows: "to
provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial com-
panies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the
United States in a manner that mitigates such risk and minimiz-
es moral hazard."5 4
Section 5384 further indicates that the authority provided in
Title II is to
be exercised in the manner that best fulfills such purpose, so that-
(1) creditors and shareholders will bear the losses of the finan-
cial company;
(2) management responsible for the condition of the financial
company will not be retained; and
(3) the [FDIC] and other appropriate agencies will take all
steps necessary and appropriate to assure that all parties, in-
cluding management, directors, and third parties, having re-
sponsibility for the condition of the financial company bear
losses consistent with their responsibility, including actions for
damages, restitution, and recoupment of compensation and
other gains not compatible with such responsibility.5
As discussed below, these purposes are evident in many of the
provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 5386, en-
titled Mandatory Terms and Conditions for all Orderly Liquida-
tion Actions, as if to hammer home those concepts, seeks to as-
sure consistency between the actions of the FDIC and the stated
objectives in § 5384.56 Section 5386 requires that the FDIC, in
taking action under Title II, "determine that such action is neces-
sary for purposes of the financial stability of the United States,
and not for the purpose of preserving the covered financial com-
pany."57 Section 5386 further provides that (i) shareholders are
not to receive payment until all "other claims" and the orderly li-
quidation fund5 (which may provide funding for the liquidation)
54. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384(a).
55. Id. § 5384(a)(1)-(3).
56. See id. § 5386(1).
57. Id. Unlike Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which seeks to foster the reorgani-
zation of a company in distress, this provision makes clear that United States financial
stability is the primary goal of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. Id.
58. Section 5390(n)(1) provides for the establishment in the Treasury of a separate
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are fully paid, (ii) unsecured creditors bear losses in accordance
with priorities established under § 5390,59 (iii) management and
members of the board of directors (or body performing similar
functions) "responsible for the failed condition of the covered fi-
nancial company" are to be removed,60 and (iv) the FDIC is not to
"take an equity interest in or become a shareholder of any covered
financial company or any covered subsidiary."6'
II. COMPANIES THAT MAY BE SUBJECT TO TITLE II OF THE
DODD-FRANK ACT
Companies that may be subject to Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Act are limited to financial companies whose failure may pose
systemic risk by virtue of their size and the nature of their busi-
ness. 62 Such determination is made by the Secretary in consulta-
tion with the President of the United States63 (the "President")
based on criteria that, for the most part, are not subject to judi-
cial review.64 In the case of a nonbank financial company that is
fund (the "Orderly Liquidation Fund"), which is to be "available to the [FDIC] to carry out
the authorities" given the FDIC under Title II. Id. § 5390(n)(1). The fund is to be used for
"the cost of actions authorized by" Title II, including the cost of the orderly liquidation,
"payment of administrative expenses, and payment of principal and interest" on obliga-
tions issued by the FDIC to the Secretary, "and the exercise of the authorities of the
[FDIC] under [Title II]." Id. Section 5394 provides that no taxpayer funds are to be used to
prevent liquidation of any financial company, funds expended in the liquidation of a finan-
cial company are to be recovered from disposition of assets or shall be the responsibility of
the financial sector through assessments, and taxpayers are to bear no losses from the ex-
ercise of the liquidation authority. Id. § 5394(a)-(c).
59. Under § 5390(b)(1), any amounts owed to the United States are second in priority
after the administrative expenses of the receiver, "unless the United States agrees or con-
sents otherwise." Id. § 5390(b)(1)(A)-(B).
60. Id. § 5386(4).
61. Id. § 5386(6). Thus, under Title II, the assistance of the federal government in ef-
fecting the orderly liquidation is limited to debt financing from the Treasury. The inability
of the FDIC to take "equity" is consistent with the preamble of the Dodd-Frank Act which
states that the Act is "to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts." Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protector Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). As noted above, in the "bailouts" of AIG, Citi-
group, and other financial companies, the United States government received preferred
and/or common equity in return for taxpayer funds, and taxpayers, rather than the credi-
tors and stockholders of those companies, bore the primary risk of repayment. See supra
notes 16, 30. Of course, the issuance of equity to the United States government had a sub-
stantial dilutive effect on the equity of the bailed-out companies. No such investment is
permitted under the Dodd-Frank Act. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5386(6).
62. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5383(a)(2).
63. Id. § 5383(b).
64. Id. § 5383(b)(1)-(7); see infra Part III.C.
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eligible to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, the Secretary's
determination is preceded by a recommendation of the FDIC and
the Federal Reserve Board (the "FRB").65 Eligibility to be classi-
fied as a covered financial company is dependent upon the non-
bank financial company satisfying the definition of "financial
company" in § 5381(a)(11), which provides that
The term "financial company" means any company that-
(A) is incorporated or organized under any provision of Federal
law or the laws of any State;
(B) is-
(i) a bank holding company, as defined in [section 2(a) of
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956],6 and
(ii) a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board
of Governors [of the Federal Reserve System];
(iii) any company that is predominantly engaged in activ-
ities that the [FRB] has determined are financial in na-
ture or incidental thereto for purposes of [section 4(k) of
the Bank Holding Company Act], other than a company
described in clause (i) or (ii)" or
65. Id. § 5383(a)(1)(A)-(B).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2006). Section 2(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act (the
"BHCA") provides that a bank holding company includes "any company which has control
over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company" under the
BHCA. Id. § 1841(a)(1). A company
has control over a bank or over any company if [it] (A) . . . directly or indirect-
ly . . . has power to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of voting securi-
ties of the bank or company; (B) . . . controls in any manner the election of a
majority of the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or (C) the [FRB]
determines, after notice and opportunity [to be heard], that the company di-
rectly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or
policies of the bank or company.
Id. § 1841(a)(2).
67. Section 5352 of the Dodd-Frank Act indicates that the Council (established by §
5321) may determine which "U.S. nonbank financial companies" are to be (i) supervised by
the FRB and (ii) subject to prudential standards based upon the Council's determination
"that material financial distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company or the nature,
scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of activities of the U.S. non-
bank financial company could pose a threat to the stability of the United States." 12
U.S.C.A. § 5323(a)(1). As noted above, these may include investment banks (subject to the
Bankruptcy Code), insurance companies (subject to state insurance company insolvency
laws) or registered securities brokers or dealers (subject to SIPA). See supra notes 46-47
and accompanying text; see also 12 U.S.C.A. § 5311(a)(4)(B) (defining "U.S. nonbank fi-
nancial company"); id. § 5311(a)(4)(D) (defining "nonbank financial company supervised by
the FRB").
68. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the term "predominately engaged in financial activi-
ties" means that either the gross annual revenues (on a consolidated basis) from activities
that are "financial in nature" represent at least eighty-five percent of its consolidated
gross revenues or eighty-five percent of its consolidated gross assets. 12 U.S.C.A. §
5311(a)(6). The BHCA defines "financial in nature" as including 'lending, exchanging, ...
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(iv) a subsidiary of any of the foregoing that is predomi-
nantly engaged in activities that the Board of Governors
has determined are financial in nature or incidental the-
reto for purpose of [section 4(k) of the Bank Holding
Company Act] (other than a subsidiary that is an insured
depository institution or an insurance company). 6 9
A farm credit system institution chartered under and subject to
the Farm Credit Act of 1971, as amended, and any federal home
loan bank, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae are expressly excluded
from the definition of a financial company. 70
Section 5381(b) further provides that:
[flor [the] purpose of the definition of the term "financial company"
under subsection (a)(11), no company shall be deemed to be predo-
minantly engaged in activities that the [FRB] has determined are fi-
nancial in nature or incidental thereto for purposes of section [4(k) of
the Bank Holding Company Act], if the consolidated revenues of
such company from such activities constitute less than 85 percent of
the total consolidated revenues of such company, as the [FDIC] in
consultation with the Secretary, shall establish by regulation. In de-
termining whether a company is a financial company, under [Title
II], the consolidated revenues derived from the ownership or control
of a depository institution shall be included.'
A "covered financial company" is defined as "a financial compa-
ny for which a determination has been made under section
5383(b), and ... does not include an insured depository institu-
tion ,"72 which would be subject to the insolvency regime under the
FDIA.73
investing, ... or safeguarding money or securities[;] [i]nsuring, guaranteeing, or indemni-
fying against loss, . . . providing, and issuing annuities[;] . . . [p]roviding financial [and]
investment services; . .. issuing or selling instruments representing pools of assets per-
missible for a bank to hold directly[;] [u]nderwriting, dealing in, or making a market in
securities." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A)-(E) (2006).
69. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5381(a)(11)(B). Proposed Rule section 380.8 establishes standards
for determining if a company is "predominately engaged in financial activities." Orderly
Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,338-39 (Mar. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 380).
70. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5381(a)(11)(C).
71. Id. § 5381(b). Proposed Rule section 380.8 would apply a "two year test" for deter-
mining whether a financial company meets the "less than 85 percent of total consolidated
revenues" requirement, defines "total consolidated revenues," and defines "financial activi-
ty" to broaden its scope for the purpose of such determination. Orderly Liquidation Au-
thority, 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,338-39.
72. Id. § 5381(a)(8)(A)-(B).
73. 12 U.S.C. § 1814.
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III. SYSTEMIC RISK DETERMINATION REQUIRED FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF THE FDIC AS RECEIVER OF A COVERED
FINANCIAL COMPANY
The appointment of the FDIC as receiver of a "covered financial
company" is a multiphase process. Section 5383 sets forth the
elements for the recommendation and the vote required for a de-
termination by the Secretary, in consultation with the President,
that the FDIC should be appointed as receiver of a financial com-
pany.14 The first step of this process is based on a recommenda-
tion by specifically designated entities, in the case of a determina-
tion to appoint the FDIC as receiver of a financial company, a
covered broker or dealer, or an insurance company."
A. Vote and Recommendation Required
"On their own initiative, or at the request of the Secretary, the
[FDIC] and the [FRB]" may, upon a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bers of the respective boards of the FDIC and the FRB, make a
recommendation as to "whether the Secretary should appoint the
[FDIC] as receiver for a financial company" that is neither a cov-
ered broker or dealer nor an insurance company."6
Section 5383(a)(2) requires that the recommendation contain:
(A) an evaluation of whether the financial company is in default or in
danger of default;
(B) a description of the effect that the default of the financial compa-
ny would have on financial stability in the United States;
(C) a description of the effect that the default of the financial compa-
ny would have on economic conditions or financial stability for low
income, minority, or underserved communities;
(D) a recommendation regarding the nature and the extent of actions
74. Id. § 5383(a)-(b).
75. Id. § 5383(a)(1).
76. Id. In the case that the financial company or its "largest United States subsidiary
(as measured by total assets as of the end of the previous calendar quarter)" is a covered
broker or dealer, the SEC and the FRB, "at the request of the Secretary, or on their own
initiative" may make a recommendation upon a vote of at least two-thirds of the members
of the FRB then sitting and of the commissioners of the SEC then serving and in consulta-
tion with the FDIC. Id. § 5383(a)(1)(B). If the financial company is an insurance company
or its 'largest United States subsidiary (as measured by total assets as of the end of the
previous calendar quarter)" is an insurance company, the designation must be approved
by the Director of the Federal Insurance Office (formed pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act)




to be taken under [Title II] regarding the financial company;
(E) an evaluation of the likelihood of a private sector alternative to
prevent the default of the financial company;
(F) an evaluation of why a case under the Bankruptcy Code is not
appropriate for the financial company;
(G) an evaluation of the effects on creditors, counterparties, and
shareholders of the financial company and other market partici-
pants; and
(H) an evaluation of whether the company satisfies the definition of
a financial company.. . ."
The requirements in subparagraphs (E), (F), and (G) that the
FDIC and the FRB consider whether a private sector alternative
could prevent default, evaluate why a case under the Bankruptcy
Code would not be appropriate, and assess the impact of Title II
on creditors and other stakeholders as well as other market par-
ticipants78 indicates an awareness that proceedings under Title II,
rather than the Bankruptcy Code, may have negative conse-
quences for creditors and other stakeholders and that a receiver-
ship under Title II should only be recommended after considera-
tion of those factors.
B. Determination by the Secretary
Upon such recommendation and vote, the Secretary, in consul-
tation with the President, may determine to appoint the FDIC as
receiver, if the Secretary determines that the following criteria
are met:
(1) the financial company is in default or in danger of default;
(2) the failure of the financial company and its resolution under oth-
erwise applicable Federal or State law would have serious adverse
effects on financial stability in the United States;
(3) no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent the de-
fault of the financial company;
(4) any effect on the claims or interests of creditors, counterparties,
and shareholders of the financial company and other market partici-
pants as a result of actions to be taken under [Title II] is appropri-
ate, given the impact that any action taken under [Title II] would
have on financial stability in the United States;
(5) any action under section [5384] would avoid or mitigate such ad-
verse effects, taking into consideration the effectiveness of the action
in mitigating potential adverse effects on the financial system, the
77. Id. § 5383(a)(2)(A)-(H).
78. Id. § 5383(a)(2)(E)-(G).
2011] 1159
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
cost to the general fund of the Treasury, and the potential to in-
crease excessive risk taking on the part of creditors, counterparties,
and shareholders in the financial company;
(6) a Federal regulatory agency has ordered the financial company to
convert all of its convertible debt instruments that are subject to the
regulatory order; and
(7) the company satisfies the definition of a financial company under
section [5381].71
Section 5383(c)(4) provides that, for the purposes of Title II, a
financial company is considered to be "in default or in danger of
default" if, as determined in accordance with § 5383(b):
(A) a case has been, or likely will promptly be, commenced with re-
spect to the financial company under the Bankruptcy Code;
(B) the financial company has incurred, or is likely to incur, losses
that will deplete all or substantially all of its capital, and there is no
reasonable prospect for the company to avoid such depletion;
(C) the assets of the financial company are, or are likely to be, less
than its obligations to creditors and others; or
(D) the financial company is, or is likely to be, unable to pay its obli-
gations (other than those subject to a bona fide dispute) in the nor-
mal course of business. 0
The differences between the recommendation to the Secretary
under § 5383(a)(2) and the "determination" of the Secretary under
§ 5383(b) indicate that a higher level of scrutiny is required by
the Secretary to reach such determination." While § 5383(a)(2)(C)
calls for "a description of the effect that the default of the finan-
cial company would have on financial stability,"" the Secretary
must determine that the "resolution of the financial company un-
der otherwise applicable Federal or State law would have serious
adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.""1 Simi-
larly, while § 5383(a)(2)(G) calls for "an evaluation of the effects
on creditors, counterparties, and shareholders of the financial
79. Id. § 5383(b). While these criteria are joined by the word "and," it is by no means
clear that each and every one of these criteria would have to be met. See id.
80. Id. § 5383(c)(4). Since the term "in default or in danger of default" is used both in
the recommendation by the applicable regulatory agency under section 5383(a) and the
determination by the Secretary under section 5383(b), it is curious that the term itself re-
fers only to "as determined in accordance with subsection (b) [of section 5383]." See id. §
5383(a)-(b).
81. Compare id. § 5383(a)(2) (detailing the required components of a written recom-
mendation of the FDIC and FRB to the Secretary), with id. § 5383(b) (detailing factors to
be considered by the Secretary in making the determination of whether to appoint the
FDIC as receiver for a financial company).
82. Id. § 5383(a)(2)(C).
83. Id. § 5383(b)(2).
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company and other market participants,"84 § 5383(b)(4) requires
the determination that "any effect on the claims or interests of
creditors, counterparties, and shareholders of the financial com-
pany and other market participants as a result of actions to be
taken under [Title II] is appropriate, given the impact [such ac-
tions] would have on financial stability in the United States.""6
Inherent in this evaluation is an acknowledgement that concerns
for the financial stability of the United States economy take pre-
cedence over the effect Title II may have upon the rights and in-
terests of creditors and other stakeholders that would otherwise
apply in a case under the Bankruptcy Code.
C. Notification of Determination and Judicial Review
Once the Secretary determines to appoint the FDIC as receiver
of the covered financial company, the Secretary must notify the
covered financial company and the FDIC of such determination.6
The Secretary will appoint the FDIC as receiver "if the board of
directors (or body performing similar functions) of the covered fi-
nancial company acquiesces or consents to the appointment of the
[FDIC] as receiver."87 Section 5387 protects members of the board
of directors (or other body performing similar functions) of a cov-
ered financial company by providing that they will not be liable to
shareholders or creditors of the financial company for acquiescing
or consenting in good faith to the appointment of the FDIC as re-
ceiver.""
"If the [members of the] board of directors (or body performing
similar functions) of the covered financial company [do] not ac-
quiesce or consent to [such appointment] . . . ," the Secretary will
file with the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia (the "District Court") a petition seeking an order authoriz-
ing the Secretary to appoint the FDIC as receiver. 8 The petition
is filed under seal,90 and the financial company is provided confi-
84. Id. § 5383(a)(2)(G).
85. Id. § 5383(b)(4) (emphasis added).
86. See id. § 5383(c)(1)(C); id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(i).
87. Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(i).
88. Id. § 5387.
89. Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(i).
90. Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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dential notice and opportunity for a confidential hearing before
the District Court. 9
While the Secretary is to present to the District Court all rele-
vant findings and the recommendation made pursuant to §
5381(a)(11), the scope of the District Court's review is limited to
whether the Secretary's determination that the "covered financial
company is in default or in danger of default and satisfies the de-
finition of a financial company" is "arbitrary and capricious."92 If
the District Court concludes that the Secretary's determination of
these two requirements is not arbitrary and capricious, it is to
"issue an order immediately authorizing the Secretary to appoint
the [FDIC] as receiver of the covered financial company."93 If the
District Court finds that such determination of the Secretary is
arbitrary and capricious, the District Court must provide a
"statement of each reason supporting [the District Court's] de-
termination and afford the Secretary an immediate opportunity
to amend and refile the petition" for the appointment of the FDIC
as receiver of the financial company.94 If twenty-four hours pass
after receipt of the petition without any decision being rendered
by the District Court, the petition will be granted by operation of
law, the FDIC will be appointed as receiver, and liquidation un-
der Title II will commence without further notice or action.95
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia (the "Court of Appeals") has jurisdiction for an expedited ap-
91. Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv).
94. Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II).
Not later than 24 hours after the appointment of the [FDIC]as receiver for a
covered financial company, the Secretary shall provide written notice of the
recommendations and determinations .. . to the Majority Leader and Minori-
ty Leader of the Senate and the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the
House of Representatives, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House
of Representatives.
Id. § 5383(c)(2). Other reports concerning the progress of the orderly liquidation are re-
quired to be made to the United States Congress and the public within sixty days after the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver and not less than quarterly thereafter. Id. §
5383(c)(3)(A)-(B).
95. Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v). 'The District Court shall establish such rules and proce-
dures as may be necessary to ensure the orderly conduct of proceedings, rules and proce-
dures including to ensure that the twenty-four hour deadline is met and that the Secre-
tary [is given] an ongoing opportunity to amend and refile petitions under subsection
(a)(1)." Id. § 5382(b)(1).
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peal of the District Court's decision filed by either the Secretary
or the financial company within thirty days of the decision of the
District Court, but the District Court's decision is final and will
not be subject to any stay or injunction pending appeal.96 The
Court of Appeal's scope of review is the same as that of the Dis-
trict Court. 9
Upon the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari within thirty
days of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of
the United States has discretionary jurisdiction to review the de-
cision of the Court of Appeals on an expedited basis, and the
scope of review is similarly limited to that of the District Court
and the Court of Appeals.98 The orderly liquidation under Title II
will continue during the pendency of any appeals."
Section 5388(a) provides that, upon the appointment of the
FDIC as receiver, not only will any pending bankruptcy proceed-
ing with respect to a covered financial company will be dismissed
upon notice to the bankruptcy court but also "no such case or pro-
ceeding may be commenced with respect to a covered financial
company at any time while the orderly liquidation is pending."99
Section 5388(b) provides for the revesting of assets of a covered
financial company that have vested in any other entity as a result
of any case under the Bankruptcy Code,'0' provided that "any or-
der entered or other relief granted by a bankruptcy court prior to
the date of appointment of the [FDIC] as receiver [is to have] the
same validity as if an orderly liquidation had not been con-
menced."102
96. Id. § 5382(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(A).
97. See id. § 5382(a)(2)(A)(iv).
98. Id. § 5382(a)(2)(B).
99. Id. § 5382(a)(1)(B) ("The decision [of the District Court] shall not be subject to any
stay or injunction pending appeal.").
100. Id. § 5388(a).
101. Id. § 5388(b).
102. Id. § 5388(c). This suggests that any sale orders or financing orders entered in a
case pending under the Bankruptcy Code prior to entry of an order appointing the FDIC
as receiver should be given the same effect as such orders would have under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. It is possible, depending on the language of a debtor in possession financing
order, that the FDIC might argue that any superpriority claims granted to a debtor in
possession lender (the "DIP Lender") should rank junior to the receiver's administrative
expenses and amounts owed to the United States. See id. § 5390(b)(1)(A), (B). On the other
hand, if the FDIC were to determine to enforce the credit agreement with the DIP Lender
as a contract to extend credit, then any valid and enforceable obligation to repay such debt
would be entitled to administrative priority treatment. See id. § 5390(c)(13)(D). Moreover,
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There is no apparent limitation on how long after a case under
Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is commenced a determi-
nation to appoint the FDIC as receiver under Title II may be
made. However, as a practical matter, a recommendation and de-
termination likely will be made under § 5383 at the outset of a
case under the Bankruptcy Code because whether or not a finan-
cial company is systemically important should be evident at that
time.
IV. APPOINTMENT OF FDIC AS RECEIVER OF A FAILING
COVERED SUBSIDIARY
Once the FDIC has been appointed as receiver of a covered fi-
nancial company, the FDIC and the Secretary are given authority
to appoint the FDIC as receiver of any failing "covered subsidiary
of the covered financial company." o3 Section 5381(a)(9) defines
"covered subsidiary" as "a subsidiary of a covered financial com-
pany, other than (A) an insured depository institution;"o' (B) an
insurance company; 105 or (C) a covered broker or dealer. 106 Subsec-
tion (a)(1)(E)(i) of § 5390 provides that:
In any case in which a receiver is appointed for a covered financial
company under section [5382], the [FDIC] may appoint itself as re-
ceiver of any covered subsidiary of the covered financial company
that is organized under Federal law or the laws of any State, if the
[FDIC] and the Secretary jointly determine that-
(I)the covered subsidiary is in default or in danger of default;
(II) such action would avoid or mitigate serious adverse effects on
the financial stability or economic conditions of the United States;
and
if the debtor in possession financing is secured, then the secured claims would not be sub-
ordinate to those of the FDIC, since secured claims, to the extent of the value of the colla-
teral, are to be unaffected by the provisions of the Title II concerning priority of claims. Id.
§ 5390(b)(5); see also id. § 5390(b)(1) (outlining the order of priority for unsecured claims).
103. See id. § 5390(a)(1)(E)(i).
104. An insured depository institution is subject to the FDIA. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006).
105. Section 5383(e), entitled treatment of insurance companies and insurance compa-
ny subsidiaries, provides that "if an insurance company is a covered financial company or
a subsidiary or affiliate of a covered financial company, the liquidation or rehabilitation of
such insurance company, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such company [that is an in-
surance company is to] be conducted as provided under applicable State law." 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 5383(e).
106. Id. § 5381(a)(9)(C). The orderly liquidation of a covered broker or dealer would be
governed by the provisions of id. § 5385.
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(III) such action would facilitate the orderly liquidation of the
covered financial company."o'
Therefore, once the FDIC is appointed as receiver of a covered
financial company, the FDIC, in consultation with the Secretary,
has broad discretion to place any entity that is a covered subsidi-
ary of a financial company that meets these three criteria into li-
quidation under the Dodd-Frank Act without seeking the consent
of the board of directors (or other similar body) of the subsidiary
or obtaining the District Court order required with respect to cov-
ered financial companies. Section 5390(a)(1)(E)(ii) provides that if
the FDIC is appointed as receiver of a covered subsidiary, "the
covered subsidiary shall thereafter be considered a covered finan-
cial company ... and the [FDIC] shall thereafter have all the
powers and rights with respect to that covered subsidiary as [the
"108
FDIC] has with respect to a covered financial company ....
The discretion given to the FDIC to extend its authority to a
failing subsidiary of a covered financial company is significant to
creditors and counterparties of systemically important subsidiar-
ies of financial companies since such creditors' and counterpar-
ties' rights may become subject to the provisions of Title II as
well, even though the covered subsidiary itself might not qualify
as a covered financial company.
V. CERTAIN POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FDIC
A. Power to Operate the Covered Financial Company, Dispose of
Assets, and Certain Other Powers
Upon appointment of the FDIC as receiver of a covered finan-
cial company, the FDIC succeeds to "(i) all rights, titles, powers,
and privileges of the covered financial company and its assets,
and of any stockholder, member, officer, or director of such com-
pany; and (ii) title to the books, records, and assets of any pre-
vious receiver or other legal custodian of such covered financial
company."109 The role of the FDIC as receiver of a financial com-
pany under Title II is similar to its role in insolvency proceedings
107. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(E)(i) (outlining additional powers with respect to failing subsidiar-
ies of a covered financial company).
108. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(E)(ii).
109. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(A).
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of an insured depository institution under the FDIA.n0 Title II re-
poses great authority in the FDIC as receiver to "take over the
assets of and operate the covered financial company with all of
the powers of the members or shareholders, the directors, and the
officers of the covered financial company, and conduct all busi-
ness of the covered financial company, [and] to perform all func-
tions of the covered financial company" in its name."' The FDIC's
exercise of its powers over the assets of the financial company is
not subject to judicial approval."'
The FDIC is given express authority under Title II to "collect
all obligations and money owed to the covered financial compa-
ny"" and may "contract for assistance in fulfilling any function,
activity, action, or duty of the [FDIC]."114 In managing the assets
and property of a covered financial company, the FDIC must do
so in a manner "consistent with maximization of the value of the
assets in the context of the orderly liquidation,"" however, its ac-
tions are not subject to judicial oversight."6
B. Power to Liquidate, Merge, and Transfer Assets and Liabilities
The FDIC has the power, subject to all legally enforceable se-
curity interests and security entitlements with respect to assets
held by the covered financial company, to "liquidate ... and wind-
up the affairs of a covered financial company [as it deems appro-
priate], including taking steps to realize upon the assets of the
covered financial company.""' The FDIC may sell the assets to
one or more third parties or form a bridge company under §
5390(h) and transfer any asset (or liability subject to certain limi-
tations) to the bridge financial company."8 The FDIC may also
110. Compare, for example, id. § 5390(a)(1)(A)-(N), with 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)-(K)
(2006 & Supp. III 2009), wherein, among other things, the FDIC similarly succeeds to "all
rights, titles, powers, and privileges of [an] insured depository institution."
111. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii).
112. Id. § 5390(a)(9)(D).
113. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(B)(ii).
114. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(B)(v). The FDIC may utilize the private sector to manage or dis-
pose of the covered financial company's assets. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(L).
115. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(B)(iv).
116. Id. § 5390(a)(9)(D).
117. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(D). See discussion infra Part VII concerning Proposed Rules relat-
ing to the rights of secured creditors.
118. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(1)(D) (referencing id. § 5390(h)).
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"merge the covered financial company with another company;
or ... transfer any asset or liability of the covered financial com-
pany ... without obtaining any approval, assignment, or consent"
of any court or stakeholder; however, the right to merge or trans-
fer assets or liabilities of the covered financial company is subject
to any applicable federal agency approval, including antitrust re-
view.'
The lack of judicial oversight of such transactions is similar to
the authority of the FDIC under the FDIA, but is in stark con-
trast to proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code. In bankruptcy
proceedings, transactions involving any use, sale, or lease of
property of a debtor, other than in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, require court approval after notice to creditors and other
parties in interest and an opportunity for such parties in interest
to be heard.120 Title 11 sets some guidelines for the FDIC concern-
ing disposal of assets. In disposing of assets, the FDIC must, "to
the greatest extent practicable," execute its powers in a way that:
(i) maximizes the net present value return from the sale or disposi-
tion of such assets; (ii) minimizes the amount of any loss realized. ..
(iii) mitigates the potential for serious adverse effects to the financial
system; (iv) ensures timely and adequate competition and fair and
consistent treatment of offerors;12 ' and (v) prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, or ethnic group in the solicitation and con-
sideration of offers. 1 2 2
Section 5390(a)(1)(G)(iii) provides that "[s]ubject to the other
provisions of [Title II], any transferee of assets . . . , including a
bridge financial company, shall be subject to such claims or rights
[of setoff] as would prevail over the rights of such transferee in
such assets under applicable noninsolvency law."123 However, the
119. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(G).
120. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006).
121. Unlike under the Bankruptcy Code, the sale process will play out entirely behind
the scenes without any opportunity for creditors or interest holders to challenge the fair-
ness of the sale procedures. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(1)(G). Nor will creditors be able to have
a court determine whether the assets are being sold to the offeror that made the "highest
or best offer." See id. § 5390(a)(9)(D). However, the lack of judicial oversight may allow the
process to proceed more quickly. Moreover, the sale of assets or operations that are finan-
cial in nature, such as a custody business, may involve special considerations for main-
taining the financial stability of the United States and a determination of what is "best"
from that standpoint, rather than from the standpoint of what maximizes the value of the
estate for the benefit of its creditors, may be appropriate under the purposes of Title II.
See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
122. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(9)(E).
123. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(G)(iii).
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FDIC is permitted to "sell assets free and clear of the setoff rights
of any party... ."124 In such case, the party will have a claim sub-
ordinate in right of payment to administrative claims of the
FDIC, claims of the United States, and certain employee claims
enumerated in subparagraphs (C) and (D) of § 5390(b)(1) but
ahead of other general and senior unsecured claims in subpara-
graph (E), "in an amount equal to the value of such setoff
rights ."125
C. The FDIC's Incidental Powers as Receiver; Employment of
Private Persons
To assist the FDIC in carrying out its responsibilities in the
management and disposition of assets from the covered financial
company, the FDIC is given not only powers specifically granted
to it as receiver under Title II but also such incidental powers ne-
cessary to carry out its duties under Title 11.126 The FDIC "may
utilize the services of private persons, including real estate and
loan portfolio asset management, property management, auction
marketing, legal, and brokerage services, if [they] are availa-
ble . . . and the [FDIC] determines that utilization of such servic-
es is practicable, efficient, and cost effective."127
D. Coordination with Foreign Financial Authorities
In exercising any of its powers, the FDIC must take into ac-
count the international aspects of the financial company's opera-
tions and assets. Section 5390(a)(1)(N) requires that where a cov-
ered financial company has assets or operations in a country
other than the United States, the FDIC is to "coordinate, to the
maximum extent possible, with the appropriate foreign financial
authorities regarding the orderly liquidation of any covered fi-
nancial company."28
124. Id. § 5390(a)(12)(F). See infra Part VII discussing priorities of claims.
125. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(12)(F).
126. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(K).
127. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(L).
128. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(N); see also id. § 5390(k) (concerning powers of the FDIC with re-
spect to the conduct of foreign investigations).
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E. Certain Legal Rights of the FDIC
1. Right to Obtain Stays of Actions
The FDIC holds certain legal rights protective of the assets of
the covered financial company and its work as receiver. Once the
FDIC has been appointed as receiver, a court will grant the
FDIC's request for "a stay in any [legal] action or proceeding in
which [the] covered financial company is or becomes a party," for
not more than 90 days.'29 This limited breathing space differs
from the automatic stay under § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,'30
which, subject to certain exceptions goes into effect immediately
upon filing a petition under §§ 301, 302, or 303 of the Bankruptcy
Code.' 3 The automatic stay remains in effect throughout a case
under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code unless a
creditor or other party in interest succeeds in meeting the specific
criteria in § 362(d) or (f) of the Bankruptcy Code required for the
bankruptcy court, after notice and a hearing, to grant relief from
the automatic stay. 3 2
2. Subpoena Power
The FDIC is given broad subpoena authority to "exercise any
power established under § 1818(n) of the [FDIA], as if the [FDIC]
were the appropriate Federal banking agency for the covered fi-
nancial company, and the covered financial company were an in-
sured depository institution."33
3. Rights with Respect to Appeals
As receiver, the FDIC is required to "abide by any final, non-
appealable judgment of any court of competent jurisdiction that
was rendered before the appointment of the [FDIC] as receiver."11
However, the FDIC has "all the rights and remedies available to
129. Id. § 5390(a)(8). See also infra Part VI for a discussion of the ninety day stay of the
exercise of certain rights of contractual counterparties under § 5390(c)(13).
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
131. Id.; see also id. § 362(b) (outlining the exceptions to § 362(a)).
132. See id. § 362(d), (f) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
133. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(1)(J) (referring to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(n)).
134. Id. § 5390(a)(9)(A).
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the covered financial company" prior to the appointment of the
FDIC as receiver, including the right to remove any case to feder-
al court as well as all rights of appeal. 13 The FDIC will not be
subject to any requirement to post any bond if it chooses to pur-
sue its rights or remedies.1 6
4. Prohibition Against Attachment and Execution
Title II prohibits any court from issuing an order of attachment
or execution with respect to assets of a covered financial company
in the possession of the FDIC as receiver. 11 This is necessary to
preserve the rights of the receiver in assets of the covered finan-
cial company since any stay of judicial proceedings under §
5390(a)(8) is limited to ninety days. 138
5. Limitation on Judicial Review
Title II precludes judicial review (except as otherwise provided
therein) of "any claim or action for payment from, or any action
seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of
any covered financial company" as well as "any claim relating to
any act or omission of such covered financial company or the
[FDIC] as receiver."3 9
6. Expansion of Statute of Limitations
The tools given to the FDIC to pursue claims of the covered fi-
nancial company or the FDIC as receiver against third parties in-
clude the expansion of the statute of limitations for actions
brought by the FDICo40 and the revival of expired state causes of
135. Id. § 5390(a)(9)(B)(i).
136. Id. § 5390(a)(9)(B)(ii).
137. Id. § 5390(a)(9)(C).
138. Id. § 5390(a)(8).
139. Id. § 5390(a)(9)(D). See infra Part VI for a discussion of the limited rights of credi-
tors to judicial review with respect to disallowance of their claims.
140. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(10)(A) (providing that the statute of limitations applica-
ble to any action brought by the FDIC as receiver is (i) the longer of six years from the
date the claim accrues or the applicable state law limitation period for contract claims and
(ii) the longer of three years from the date the claim accrues or the applicable state law
limitation period for tort claims). The expansion of applicable statutes of limitations under




action for tort claims arising from fraud or intentional misconduct
resulting in unjust enrichment or substantial loss to the covered
financial company, so long as the statute of limitations under
state law has not expired more than five years before the date of
appointment of the FDIC as receiver. 141
F. Termination of Rights and Claims of Stockholders and
Creditors
To assure the FDIC that stockholders and creditors will not be
able to interfere with the orderly liquidation process, § 5390(a)
(1)(M) provides that the FDIC as receiver must:
terminate all rights and claims that the stockholders and creditors of
the covered financial company may have against the assets of the
covered financial company or the [FDIC] arising out of their status
as stockholders or creditors, except for their right to payment, reso-
lution, or other satisfaction of their claims.14 2
Section 5390(a)(1)(M) further provides that the FDIC is to ensure
that all losses are borne by the unsecured creditors and share-
holders of the covered financial company "consistent with the
priority of claims provisions under [§ 5930(b)]."143
VI. DETERMINATION, RESOLUTION, AND PAYMENT OF CLAIMS
To the extent that funds are available, the FDIC is required to
"pay all valid obligations . . . that are due and payable at the time
of the appointment of the [FDIC] as receiver, in accordance with
the prescriptions and limitations of [Title II]."144 This means that
If applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy pro-
ceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor may com-
mence an action, and such period has not expired before the date of filing of
the petition, the trustee may commence such action before the later of (1) the
end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring after
the commencement of the case; or (2) two years after [the commencement of
the case]."
11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2006). Title II has the effect of exposing those who deal with financial
companies to the risk of litigation for a longer period of time than under the Bankruptcy
Code.
141. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(10)(C).
142. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(M). As discussed below, § 5390(a)(2) through 5390(a)(7) address
rights of creditors with respect to the determination, resolution, and payment of their
claims. See id. § 5390(a)(2)-(7).
143. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(M).
144. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(H).
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payment of obligations must comport with other provisions of
Title II that deal with the payment of claims,145 including, but not
limited to, the procedures for determination and payment of
proven claims in § 5390(a)(2)-(7),'146 the treatment of similarly si-
tuated creditors under §§ 5390(b)(4), 5390(d)(4) and 5390(h)
(3)(E),1 47 and the priority scheme under § 5390(b). 4 1
A. Claim Determination Procedures
1. Establishment of Bar Date for Filing Claims
Title II requires that the FDIC publish notice to creditors of a
covered financial company for the filing of claims together with
proof by a specified date (the "bar date") which is to be "at least
90 days after the date of publication of such notice.""' The FDIC
is also required to mail notice to creditors of the bar date.s0
2. FDIC's Determination of Claims
Prior to 180 days after the FDIC receives a claim (unless ex-
tended by agreement with the claimant), the FDIC must give the
claimant notice of allowance or disallowance of the claim.'' How-
ever, a claim will be deemed to be disallowed if the FDIC fails to
notify the claimant of the disallowance of the claim within the
180 day period.i1i Any claim filed after the date specified in the
notice of bar date filed by the FDIC will be disallowed, provided
145. See id.
146. Id. § 5390(a)(2)-(7).
147. Id. §§ 5390(b)(4), (d)(4), (h)(3)(E).
148. Id. § 5390(b).
149. Id. § 5390(a)(2)(B)(i). Such notice must be republished one and two months after
the initial publication. Id. § 5390(a)(2)(B)(ii).
150. Id. § 5390(a)(2)(C). Proposed Rule section 380.33 would permit the FDIC, after
notice of bar date by publication and mailing has been given, to communicate "by electron-
ic media with any claimant who expressly agrees to such form of communication." Orderly
Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,343 (proposed Mar. 23, 2011) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380). Proposed Rule section 380.33 also requires notice to any claimant
discovered after the claims bar date, with such claimant required to file its claim within 90
days of the notice mailed to such claimant. Id.
151. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(A). Mailing of notice is sufficient under § 5390(a)(3)(A)(iii) but
Proposed Rule section 380.37(a) would also permit electronic notice where a claim is filed
electronically. Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,343. Proposed Rule sec-
tion 380.34 details the procedures for filing a claim. Id.
152. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(3)(A)(ii).
[Vol. 45:11431172
ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY
that the FDIC may consider any such claim if "the claimant did
not receive notice of the appointment of the receiver in time to file
such claim" and the "claim is filed in time to permit payment.""5
3. Disallowance of Claims
The FDIC is authorized to "disallow any portion of any claim by
a creditor or claim of a security, preference, setoff, or priority
which is not proved to the satisfaction of the [FDIC]."15 However,
the FDIC may not disallow, in whole or in part, "any extension of
credit from any Federal reserve bank or the [FDIC] to any cov-
ered financial company; or . .. any legally enforceable and per-
fected security interest in the assets of the covered financial com-
pany securing any such extension of credit," subject to the
limitations for undersecured claims.55
To the extent that the amount of a claim exceeds the fair mar-
ket value of the property of a covered financial company that se-
cures the claim, the excess will be treated as an unsecured claim,
and no payment may be made on the unsecured portion of the
claim until payment is made on all unsecured claims. "6
4. Filing Suit is Required Absent Notice of Allowance of Claim
Although the filing of a claim constitutes the commencement of
an action under any applicable statute of limitations,"' a clai-
mant who has not received notice that its claim is allowed must
file suit on the claim in the United States district court or terri-
torial court where the principal place of business of the covered
financial company is located, or continue an action that was
commenced before the date of appointment of the FDIC as receiv-
er in the court where the suit is pending within sixty days of the
earlier of (i) the end of the 180 day period (or any extension the-
reof) for the FDIC's determination of disallowance or (ii) the date
153. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(C).
154. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(D)(i).
155. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(D)(iii).
156. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(D)(ii).
157. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(E)(i). The filing of a claim will "not prejudice any right of [a] clai-
mant to continue any action [that] was filed before" the appointment of the FDIC as re-
ceiver. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(E)(ii).
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of notice of any disallowance.158 Failure to bring such suit within
such time period will render the disallowance final "and the clai-
mant [will] have no further rights or remedies with respect to
such claim."119
5. Comparison of Claim Resolution Process under Title II and
the Bankruptcy Code
The FDIC is given authority under Title II to review claims
and either allow or disallow claims in whole or in part.160 This un-
ilateral authority is similar to that granted to the FDIC under the
FDIA161 and to the SIPC trustee under SIPA.162 This authority dif-
fers significantly from the authority afforded Chapter 7 trusteesl63
or Chapter 11 debtors in possession 6 4 under the Bankruptcy Code
with respect to allowance or disallowance of claims.
The methodology for resolving claims under Title II also differs
significantly from that of the Bankruptcy Code. Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, a claim is deemed allowed unless a party in interest,
including the Chapter 7 trustee or debtor in possession, files an
objection to the claim with the bankruptcy court.16 Only if the
claimant fails to respond to the objection, or the bankruptcy court
sustains the objection of the trustee or debtor in possession, as
applicable, after the claimant has had an opportunity to respond
158. Id. § 5390(a)(4)(A)-(B). See Proposed Rule section 380.38 concerning procedures
for seeking determination of disallowed claims. Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed.
Reg. 16,324, 16,343-44 (proposed Mar. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
159. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(4)(C).
160. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(D).
161. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(5) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(a)-(b).
162. See 12 U.S.C.A.§ 5385(a)(2)(D).
163. Compare id. § 5390(a)(3)(D) (stating "the [FDIC] may disallow any portion of any
claim"), with 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (stating that a trustee must "examine proofs of claim
and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper").
164. Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(3)(D) (stating "the [FDIC] may disallow any por-
tion of any claim"), with 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (permitting any party in interest, including a
debtor, a Chapter 7 trustee, or any creditor to object to a claim). See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b)
(defining the term "party in interest").
165. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). The Chapter 7 trustee or debtor in possession bears the burden
of proof with respect to its objection; only if the debtor meets its burden does the creditor
have the burden of overcoming the objection. 3-51 Collier Bankr. Prac. Guide (MB)




and to appear and be heard with respect to the objection, is the
claim disallowed in whole or in part.166
Under Title II, a claimant who would contest a claim determi-
nation by the FDIC must timely file a suit (or continue an action
if such action were pending with respect to the claim prior to the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver) "in the district or territorial
court of the United States for the district [where] the principal
place of business of the covered financial company is located."167
Thus, unlike the Bankruptcy Code where the debtor or trustee
must take action to object to a claim and must in its objection es-
tablish sufficient, credible facts to rebut the prima facie presump-
tion of the validity of the claim before the burden of proof reverts
to the creditor,168 under Title II, the creditor has the burden of in-
itiating a challenge to the FDIC's disallowance in whole or in part
of its claim.69
B. Expedited Procedure for Certain Secured Claims
1. Expedited Treatment in Some Instances; Allowance or
Disallowance
Title II requires the FDIC to "establish a procedure for expe-
dited relief ... for any claimant that alleges [that it has] a legally
valid and enforceable or perfected security interest in property of
a covered financial company ... and that irreparable injury will
occur" if the procedure for resolution of claims under § 5390(a)(3)
is followed.7 0 While § 5390(a)(5) provides an expedited process for
166. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). Except as provided in subsections (e)(2), (f), (g), (h), and (i) of §
502(b), if an objection to a claim is made, "the court after notice and a hearing, shall de-
termine the amount of such claim . . . and shall allow such claim in such amount," subject
to the limitations in subparagraphs (1)-(9) of § 502(b). Id. Section 502 establishes the
bases for allowance and disallowance of a claim by the court. See, e.g., id. § 502(d), (e)(1)
(providing "the court shall disallow any claim ....
167. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(4)(A).
168. See Lundell v. Anchor Constr. Specialists, Inc. (In re Lundell), 223 F.3d 1035,
1038-40 (9th Cir. 2000).
169. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(3)(D) (regarding the FDIC's authority to disallow
claims); id. § 5390(a)(4) (regarding the action to be taken by a creditor to obtain a judicial
determination of the claim); see also id. § 5390(a)(5).
170. Id. § 5390(a)(5)(A). There is no indication of what would satisfy the requirement of
irreparable injury. Failure of the FDIC to maintain assets securing a claim that results in
decline in the value of such assets may be one such situation depending on the date used
for the valuation of collateral. See Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,207, 4,212 (Jan.
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determining a claim that is faster than the process under § 5390
(a)(3),"1 there appears to be no means for secured creditors to ob-
tain an immediate determination of the validity, perfection, and
priority of their secured claims or the value of their collateral.
Proposed Rule section 380.53 would require the FDIC to deter-
mine within ninety days of the date of the request by the secured
creditor for expedited relief "whether to allow or disallow such
claim, or any portion thereof, or. .. whether such claim should be
determined pursuant to the [regular] procedures [under §
5390(a)(3)] ."172 If the claim is disallowed, the notice must state
"each reason for the disallowance and the procedure for obtaining
a judicial determination."171 However, expedited determination of
secured claims is entirely within the discretion of the FDIC.1 74
2. Remedy Upon Disallowance
A claimant that seeks expedited determination of its secured
claim may file suit (or continue a suit filed prior to the date of the
FDIC's appointment as receiver) seeking a determination of the
claimant's rights with respect to its security interest (or any secu-
rity entitlement) "after the earlier of (i) the end of the 90-day pe-
riod beginning on the date of the filing of a request for expedited
relief' or (ii) the date of the FDIC's denial of the claim or a por-
tion thereof.175
The creditor must either file suit, or a motion to renew a pre-
viously filed suit within thirty days from the date such action or
motion may be filed.171 Otherwise, the secured claim will, to the
25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380). Section 380.2 of the Interim Final Rule es-
tablishes that the FDIC will use the fair market value of collateral as of the date the FDIC
was appointed as receiver; however, the FDIC seeks comment on whether such valuation
date should be used for all types of collateral, or only government securities or other pub-
licly traded securities. Id.
171. Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(5) (detailing the process for the "expedited deter-
mination of claims"), with id. § 5390(a)(3) (outlining the standard procedure for the resolu-
tion of claims).
172. Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,344 (proposed Mar. 23,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
173. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(5)(B).
174. Id. § 5390(a)(9)(D).
175. Id. § 5390(a)(5)(C). It is unclear whether denial (or disallowance) of the claim is
necessary to bring the suit or whether the right to bring suit applies in the event that the
FDIC determines that the procedures under § 5390(a)(3) should apply to the claim.
176. Id. § 5390(a)(5)(D).
[Vol. 45:11431176
ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY
extent not allowed, be deemed disallowed as of the end of such
period. 117
3. Tolling of Statute of Limitations
The filing of a claim with the FDIC whether under § 5390(a)(3)
or § 5390(a)(5) will constitute the commencement of an action and
will, therefore, toll the applicable statute of limitations. 17 Subject
to the FDIC's rights under § 5390(a)(8), the filing of a claim will
"not prejudice any right of the claimant to continue any action
which was filed before the appointment of the [FDIC] as receiv-
er."179
4. Comparison of Secured Creditor's Bankruptcy Code Rights
and Rights Under Title II
As noted above, to the extent that a claim is determined to be
undersecured under the expedited determination process, no
payment may be made on the "unsecured portion of the claim,
[except] in connection with the disposition of all claims of unse-
cured creditors."o80 However, there is no provision under Title II
comparable to § 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code that allows a se-
cured creditor to seek to lift the automatic stay so that it can fo-
reclose on the assets that secure its debt,181 or § 363(k) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which allows the secured creditor to credit bid
its debt in a sale of the assets securing such debt if it believes
that the proceeds from a sale would not properly value its claim.' 2
Because Title II is intended to leave to the FDIC the maximiza-
tion of the value of the covered financial company's assets' 3 and
177. Id.
178. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(E)(i), (5)(E)(i).
179. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(E)(ii), (5)(E)(ii); see also supra note 129 and accompanying text
(discussing § 5390(a)(8)).
180. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(D)(ii)(II). Compare id., with 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(i) (2006) (bifurcat-
ing a claim between a secured claim to the extent of the value of the collateral securing the
claim and an unsecured claim for the balance). Under § 506(a), a claim that is subject to
setoff under § 553 is a secured claim "to the extent of the amount subject to setoff." 11
U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). However, rights of setoff (if assets are sold by the FDIC free of setoff
right) will only be entitled to priority over general and senior liability claims. See 12
U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(12)(F).
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
182. Id. § 363(k).
183. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(1)(B)(iv).
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no judicial approval of sales of assets or merger transactions is
required,14 unless (i) the secured creditor can convince the FDIC
to sell the assets to it for what the secured creditor believes is the
fair market value or (ii) the FDIC determines to assume the se-
cured debt or have a bridge financial company assume the se-
cured debt,'"' the secured creditor's only remedy appears to be to
bring an action under § 5390(a)(5) or § 5390(a)(3), as applicable, if
the creditor disagrees with the FDIC's valuation.""
Other issues remain with respect to the amount of a secured
creditor's claim. Title II also does not specify whether interest
and other charges, including legal fees, accrued or incurred after
appointment of the FDIC as receiver may be paid to secured cred-
itors to the extent that the value of their collateral exceeds the
debt as provided under § 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 87 How-
ever, § 5390(c)(3)(D) of Title II provides that where the FDIC re-
pudiates a debt obligation that is secured by property of a value
greater than the amount of the claim for principal and accrued
interest (and accreted original issue discount to the date of ap-
pointment of the receiver), interest on the claim will be paid to
the date of repudiation.8 8 Moreover, it is unclear to what extent
the requirement under § 5390(a)(7)(B)-that creditors of a cov-
ered financial company eligible to be a debtor under the Bank-
ruptcy Code receive no less than they would receive in a case un-
184. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(G)(i).
185. Id. § 5390(h)(1)(B)(i).
186. The FDIC has proposed a number of rules that address the rights of secured credi-
tors and the FDIC with respect to the secured creditor's collateral, some of which will have
a bearing on the valuation of the secured claim. For example, Proposed Rule section
380.51 deals with the right of a secured creditor to seek the consent of the FDIC to obtain
possession of or exercise control over its collateral, or to foreclose upon or sell its collateral.
Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,344 (proposed Mar. 23, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380). Proposed Rule section 380.53 clarifies that the FDIC may
sell collateral free and clear of the security interest in such collateral, with the security
interest attaching to the proceeds and the right of the secured creditor, in the event of a
sale, to acquire the property by credit bidding the amount of its claim. Id. Further, Pro-
posed Rule section 380.54 provides to the FDIC a right of "redemption from security inter-
est," which permits the FDIC to pay the secured creditor in cash the fair market value of
the collateral "free and clear of such security interest." Id. at 16,344.
187. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
188. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(3)(D). Since interest on a secured claim is to be paid to the
date of repudiation, it would appear that, to the extent that a secured creditor challenges
the FDIC's determination of value, interest that accrues or original issue discount that
accretes after the date of repudiation of the debt but before payment of such claim may not
be able to be paid, unless § 5390(a)(7)(B) of Title II would protect the right to such pay-
ment to the extent that such interest and accreted original issue discount would be paid in
a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. See id. § 5390(a)(7)(B).
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der Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code'89-would be protective of
the rights of secured creditors to payment of interest, fees, ex-
penses, and other charges that accrue or are incurred after the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver. Notwithstanding the lan-
guage of § 5390(c)(3)(D) relating to the amount of a claim arising
from a debt obligation upon repudiation, 0 an argument could be
made that all post-receivership interest and charges to the date of
payment by the FDIC should also be paid up to the value of the
collateral so long as the requirement in § 5390(a)(7)(B) applies to
both secured and unsecured claims.
C. Payment of Claims
Under § 5390(a)(7)(A), the FDIC as receiver has the discretion
to pay creditor claims to the extent that funds are available, "in
such manner and amounts as are authorized under [§ 5390]," so
long as such claims "are (i) allowed by the [FDIC]; (ii) approved
by the [FDIC] pursuant to a final determination" under the regu-
lar or expedited claim determination procedures under §
5390(a)(3) and § 5390(a)(5), respectively, "or (iii) determined
by the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction."'9' The
FDIC may pay dividends on proven claims at any time, and the
FDIC may not be held liable "by reason of [any] such payment or
for failure to pay dividends to a claimant whose claim is not
proved at the time of any such payment."9 2
This provision is intended to allow payments to creditors with
proven claims even if there are other claims that have yet to be
proved.'9' Such advance payment of unsecured claims is not per-
mitted in a liquidation under Chapter 7 since § 726(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that commencement of distributions of
property of the estate is to begin with respect to priority claims on
the earlier of (i) ten days after mailing to creditors of the trustee's
189. Id. § 5390(a)(7)(B) (referring to § 5390(d)(2)-(3)).
190. Id. § 5390(c)(3)(D).
191. Id. § 5390(a)(7)(A). Proposed Rule section 380.20 defines "allowed claim" as "a
claim against the receivership that is allowed by the [FDIC] or upon which a final nonap-
pealable judgment has been entered in favor of a claimant against a receivership by a
court with jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim." Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed.
Reg. 16,324, 16,340 (proposed Mar. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
192. Id. § 5390(a)(7)(C).
193. See id.
2011]1 1179
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
final report, or (ii) the date on which the trustee commences final
distribution. 194
Section 5390(a)(7)(D) permits the FDIC to establish rules with
respect to the payment of post-insolvency interest, including es-
tablishment of an interest rate, provided that such interest may
not be paid until the principal amount of all creditor claims is sa-
tisfied."9 5
The term "principal amount" is not defined in Title III6 and it
is unclear whether the term refers to the full amount of the al-
lowed claim including any claim for unpaid interest to the date of
the appointment of the FDIC or the date of repudiation of a con-
tract, as applicable. However, Proposed Rule section 380.25,
which addresses post-insolvency interest, clarifies that principal
amount is "the full allowed claim amount, including any interest
that may have accrued to the extent the interest is included in
the allowed claim."197 While the plain language of § 5390(a)(7)(D)
could be read to apply to both secured and unsecured claims,
based on Proposed Rule section 380.21, the provision concerning
post-insolvency interest would apply to unsecured claims and be
comparable to the right of unsecured creditors to be paid interest
in a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.""
1. Required Payment Amount
As noted above, § 5390(a)(7)(B) provides that in no event shall
a creditor be paid "less than the amount that the creditor is en-
194. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (2006). Similarly, under Chapter 11, with few exceptions,
pre-petition unsecured claims will not be paid until a plan has been confirmed. See Bruce
S. Nathan, Payment of Pre-Petition Unsecured Trade Claims During a Chapter 11 Case,
ALLBUSINESS (Apr. 1, 2000), http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/3486332-1.html.
195. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(7)(D).
196. See id.
197. Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,342 (proposed Mar. 23,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
198. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(7)(D); see also Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg.
at 16,341. Compare id., with 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (allowing payment of interest on unse-
cured claims, at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the petition, to the extent that
all priority claims, unsecured claims, subordinated claims, late filed claims, and penalty
and punitive damage claims have been paid in full). Under the Bankruptcy Code, post-
petition interest on secured claims would be paid at the contractual rate up to the value of
the collateral that secures the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506. See also Orderly Liquidation Author-




titled to receive under" § 5390(d)(2) or (d)(3).1** Section 5390(d)(2)
provides that:
The maximum liability of the [FDIC], acting as receiver ... to any
person having a claim against the [FDIC] as receiver or the covered
financial company ... shall equal the amount that such claimant
would have received if (A) the [FDIC] had not been appointed receiv-
er [of the] covered financial company; and (B) the covered financial
company had been liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code."20 0
Although § 5390(d)(2) and (d)(3) speak of the "maximum liabili-
ty" of the FDIC as receiver for a covered financial company to any
person having a claim against the FDIC as receiver or the covered
financial company, the Senate Report for the predecessor bill in-
dicates that, in fact, the "maximum liability" under § 5390(d)(2) is
intended to be the minimum amount that must be paid to a credi-
tor of the covered financial company on its claim. 201
2. Issues Related to Determination of "Required Payment
Amount"
Nonetheless, we are still left with the conundrum of how the
FDIC is to determine what each creditor would have been paid in
the hypothetical Chapter 7 case20 2 and under what circumstances
199. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(7)(B).
200. Id. § 5390(d)(2). Section 5390(d)(2) also applies to covered financial companies
that would be liquidated under "any similar provision of State insolvency law applicable to
the covered financial company." Id. Section 5390(d)(3) relates to the maximum liability of
the FDIC with respect to certain claims against a covered broker or dealer. Id. §
5390(d)(3).
201. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 61 (2010) (discussing the priority of expenses and unse-
cured claims under § 5390(b), stating: "All claimants that are similarly situated in the ex-
penses and claims priority shall not receive less than the maximum liability amount de-
fined in subsection (d)"). One article suggests that whether the requirement under §
5390(a)(7)(B) "will be read as a limitation on the U.S. priority [under § 5390(b)(1)(B)] is
uncertain." Ren6e Dailey & Katherine Lindsay, The Dodd-Frank Act: The New World of
Systemically Risky Financial Companies and What It Means for Creditors, 22 BNA BANKR.
L. REP. 1283 (2010). The statement suggests that if § 5390(a)(7)(B) is the overriding prin-
ciple with respect to payment of claims, it may trump rights of priority accorded the Unit-
ed States under § 5390(b)(1)(B).
202. Section 1129(a)(7)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and the case law relating to it may
provide helpful precedent for determining what the recovery to a creditor in a hypothetical
Chapter 7 case would be. Section 1129(a)(7)(A) provides that, as a condition for confirma-
tion of a plan of reorganization,
[w]ith respect to each impaired class of claims or interests . . . each holder of
a claim or interest of such class (i) has accepted the plan; or (ii) will receive or
retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest property of a value,
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and in what forum a creditor could challenge the FDIC's determi-
nation that the amount paid to a creditor in respect of its claim is
"no less than" the amount it would receive in a case under Chap-
ter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. It appears that such challenge
could be made in connection with a creditor challenge of the
FDIC's determination of its claim so long as the distributable as-
sets of the covered financial company are known by both the cred-
itor and the FDIC. However, Title II does not require that the
FDIC provide to each creditor a calculation of what it contends
the creditor would receive on its claim in a case under Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code. 203
It appears that but for the requirement in § 5390(a)(7)(B) that
creditors receive no less than they would receive in a case under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code,2 04 under a strict application of
the priorities established in § 5390(b)(1), 205 certain unsecured
creditors might receive less under Title II than they would under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code because the priority scheme
under Chapter 7 is different from that under § 5390(b) of Title
11.206 For example, claims arising from rights of setoff would be
treated as secured claims under § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
and, therefore, have priority over all unsecured claims, including
administrative and priority claims. 2 07 However, under § 5390(a)
(12)(F), certain claims arising from setoff would be subordinate to
claims payable under subparagraphs (A), (B), (C) and (D) of
§ 5390(b)(1).20 8 If funds were insufficient to pay all administrative
and priority claims in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of § 5390
(b)(1), then the setoff claim under § 5390(a)(12)(F) would not be
paid under Title 11,203 even though it would, as a secured claim,
as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such
holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter
7.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2006). Section 1129(a)(7)(B) applies to secured creditors that
make an election under § 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(B); see also 7-
1129 Collier on Bankr. (MB) 1129.02[7] (2010) (concerning the factors considered in de-
termining whether the recovery under a plan of reorganization of a dissenting creditor
meets the requirements of § 1129(a)(7), i.e., the "best interests test").
203. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
204. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(7)(B).
205. Id. § 5390(b)(1); see infra Part VII discussing the priority of claims.
206. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
207. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a); see also supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.




have to be paid under the Bankruptcy Code before payment of
administrative and priority claims,2 10 unless the requirement un-
der § 5390(a)(7)(B) trumps the priority provisions of § 5390(b)(1)
and it could be shown that the creditor with setoff rights would
receive less than it would in a Chapter 7 case.211 In addition, since
the priority provisions of § 726 of the Bankruptcy Code differ
from those provided in § 5390(b)(1) (A) and (B),212 it is possible
that certain claimants would, but for the requirement in § 5390
(a)(7)(B), 2 13 receive less than they would receive in a liquidation
under Chapter 7.
Furthermore, Title II and the Bankruptcy Code have different
means of measuring the amount of certain claims, such as claims
in respect of qualified financial contracts, that may effectively re-
sult in a different recovery on such claims. 2 14 Since both §
5390(a)(7)(B) and § 5390(d)(2) speak in terms of what a "clai-
mant" or "creditor" would have received,215 differences in claim
amounts would appear to be relevant to the minimum amount a
creditor is entitled to receive. A further difference in the determi-
nation of claims arising from qualified financial contracts under
Title II and the Bankruptcy Code is that while the Bankruptcy
Code only permits termination or rejection of such contracts be-
tween the debtor and the nondebtor counterparty, 2 16 Title II per-
mits disaffirmance or repudiation of qualified financial contracts
between the debtor and the nondebtor counterparty or its affili-
ates. 217 Thus, while close-out netting under the Bankruptcy Code
would apply to qualified financial contracts between the debtor
and the nondebtor party, Title II would also apply to qualified fi-
nancial contracts with affiliates and would appear to permit
cross-affiliate close-out netting to the extent provided under the
relevant qualified financial contracts. 2 18 Therefore, the amount
210. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)-(B).
211. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(7)(B), (a)(12)(F), (b)(1)
212. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 726, with 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(1)(A)-(B).
213. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(7)(B) (requiring that a creditor receive at least as much as it
would under a Chapter 7 liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code).
214. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 561(a), 562 (concerning rights of close-out netting and de-
termination of claims arising from the early termination or rejection of qualified financial
contracts), with 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(3), (11) (concerning the calculation of damages and
disaffirmance or repudiation of qualified financial contracts).
215. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(7)(B), (d)(2).
216. See 11 U.S.C. § 561(b)(1).
217. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(11)(A).
218. See id.
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that a counterparty to one or more qualified financial contracts
would receive under Title II in respect of its claim may differ from
the amount it would have received in a liquidation under Chapter
7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Given these issues, regulations are necessary to clarify (i) how
the calculations called for in § 5390(a)(7)(B) and § 5390(d)(2) are
to be made; (ii) whether or under what circumstances the FDIC
must provide a creditor with a calculation of what it believes the
creditor would receive on its claim under Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, and; (iii) under what circumstances and in what fo-
rum a creditor might seek to enforce its right to be paid no less
than it would receive under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. It
would also be helpful if regulations clarified how, if the amount
paid to any creditor under Title II was less than the amount that
the creditor would receive under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code, such amount would be funded, especially if the proceeds
from the disposition of the assets of the covered financial compa-
ny were insufficient to pay higher priority claims (including
amounts owed to the United States under § 5390(b)(1)(B)). 219
VII. PRIORITY OF CLAIMS
A. In General
Section 5390(b)(1) provides the following priorities for the
payment of unsecured claims, including the undersecured portion
of secured claims, against the covered financial company or the
FDIC as receiver:
(A) Administrative expenses of the [FDIC as] receiver[;]
(B) Any amounts owed to the United States, unless the United
States agrees or consents otherwise[;]
(C) Wages, salaries, or commissions including vacation, severance,
and sick leave pay earned by an individual (other than [senior execu-
tives and directors]), but only to the extent of $11,725 for each indi-
vidual (as indexed for inflation, by regulation of the [FDIC]) earned
not later than 180 days before 2 0 the date of appointment of the
219. Id. § 5390(b)(1)(B); see also discussion infra Part VII.
220. The words "not later than 180 days before" (as contrasted with the words "within
180 days before" under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) and (a)(5)), could be read to include wages
preceding the 180th day before appointment of the receiver. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)-(5).
However, it is likely that such reading was not intended since the legislative history indi-




(D) Contributions owed to employee benefit plans arising from ser-
vices rendered not later than 180 days before the date of appoint-
ment of the [FDIC] as receiver, to the extent of the number of em-
ployees covered by such plan, multiplied by $11,725 (as indexed for
inflation, by regulation of the [FDIC]) less the aggregate amount
paid to such employees under subparagraph (C) plus the aggregate
amount paid by the receivership on behalf of such employees to any
other employee benefit plan[;]
(E) Any other general or senior liability of the covered financial com-
pany (which is not a liability described under subparagraph (F), (G),
or (H)) [;]
(F) Any obligation subordinated to general creditors (which is not an
obligation described under subparagraph (G) or (H))[;]
(G) Any wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, sever-
ance, and sick leave pay earned, owed to senior executives and direc-
tors of the covered financial company[;]
(H) Any obligation to shareholders, members, general partners, li-
mited partners, or other persons, with interests in the equity of the
covered financial company arising as a result of their status as [such
equity interest holders].221
What qualifies as claims in the first two levels of priority is
significant because they relate to the funds that must be recouped
by the FDIC and the federal government before other creditors
are paid anything.
"Administrative expenses of the receiver" are defined in § 5381
of Title II as including "(A) the actual, necessary costs and ex-
penses incurred by the [FDIC] as receiver for a covered financial
company in liquidating a covered financial company; and (B) any
obligations that the [FDIC] as receiver . .. determines are neces-
sary and appropriate to facilitate the smooth and orderly liquida-
tion of the covered financial company."222 Section 5390(a)(15) pro-
vides that payment of "any final ... judgment for monetary
damages entered against the [FDIC] as receiver for a covered fi-
nancial company for the breach of an agreement executed or ap-
proved by the [FDIC] after the date of its appointment shall be
paid as an administrative expense of the [FDIC] ."223
be the same as that under the Bankruptcy Code. See Conference Report, 156 CONG. REC.
E1347, E1348 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Rep. John Conyers Jr.).
221. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(1).
222. Id. § 5381(a)(1).
223. Id. § 5390(a)(15). Proposed Rule section 380.22 clarifies the scope of the definition
and indicates that the items listed therein are not exclusive. Orderly Liquidation Authori-
ty, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,341 (proposed Mar. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
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It is not clear from the language of § 5390(b)(1)(B) whether
"amounts owed to the United States" include not only amounts
funded by the Treasury pursuant to Title II, but also taxes, pe-
nalties, fines, environmental liabilities, unfunded pension liabili-
ties, and other amounts owed to the United States government. 224
Proposed Rule section 380.23 clarifies that amounts advanced by
the Treasury or any other department, agency, or instrumentality
of the United States, whether advanced before or after the ap-
pointment of the FDIC as receiver are "owed to the United
States" for the purposes of § 5390(b)(1)(B), as are amounts owed
to such U.S. governmental entities under guaranties of debt pur-
suant to certain federal guarantee programs.225 Amounts owed to
the United States also include unsecured accrued and unpaid
taxes, and the amount of any unsecured debt owed to a federal
reserve bank and extensions of credit by the FDIC including un-
der § 5384(d). 226 Under § 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, cer-
tain unsecured claims of governmental units (both federal and
state) are given priority over unsecured claims, subject to the cat-
egories and limits set forth therein. 227 Therefore, claims of the
United States that were otherwise nonpriority unsecured claims
under the Bankruptcy Code may be elevated and could have a
significant impact on the recovery of other unsecured claims, in-
cluding claims of states for taxes unless § 5390(a)(7)(B) precludes
such result. The supplemental information section to the Interim
Final Rule indicates that § 5390(d)(2) should have that effect,
stating "In addition, creditors also are guaranteed that they will
receive no less than they would have received if the covered fi-
nancial company had been liquidated under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code."228
It is also unclear what qualifies as "subordinated debt" under §
5390(b)(1)(F). The use of the term "obligation" suggests that sub-
380). See also infra notes 236-239 and accompanying text for a discussion of the grant
pursuant to § 5390(b)(2) of administrative expense status to debt obtained by the FDIC in
the case that credit is not otherwise available from commercial sources. See also infra note
321 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 5390(c)(13)(D) concerning administrative
expense treatment of obligations under contracts to extend credit assumed by the FDIC.
224. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(1)(B).
225. Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,341.
226. Id.
227. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
228. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,207, 4,209 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at
380 C.F.R. pt. 380).
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paragraph (F) is intended to give effect to contractual subordina-
tion of debt.229 However, in many instances, contractual subordi-
nation will be to limited types of debt such as "money borrowed
indebtedness" and not to trade debt. It is, therefore, unclear how
subordination will be given effect under subparagraph (E) where
only senior debt and not all unsecured debt has the benefit of the
subordination (i.e., whether senior creditors that have the benefit
of contractual subordination will receive a higher recovery than
general creditors would under the Bankruptcy Code). The use of
the words "subordinated to general creditors" in subparagraph (F)
raises a similar question as to the treatment of subordinated
claims since contractual subordination may not apply to general
creditors but only to creditors whose claims are contractually se-
nior.2 30
Moreover, it should be noted that § 510 of the Bankruptcy Code
recognizes the subordination of three types of subordinated debt
(i) contractually subordinated debt; (ii) mandatorily subordinated
debt that relates to claims for damages arising from rescission of
a purchase or sale of a security due to, among other things, fraud
(often involving a claim relating to an equity interest); and (iii)
debt that may be equitably subordinated based upon the inequit-
able conduct of the creditor up to the amount of the harm caused
by the inequitable conduct.2 1 It is unclear whether these other
forms of subordination are to be recognized under § 5390(b)(1)(E)
of Title II. Certain provisions of Title II partially address these
issues. For example, § 5390(b)(1)(H) subordinates obligations to
equity interest holders based on their status as equity interest
holders to all other unsecured claims. 232 Such obligations may be
subordinated under § 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 233 However,
there is no provision in Title II concerning subordination of res-
cission claims of debt holders to other unsecured claims.2 34 The
subordination in § 5390(b)(1)(G) of claims of senior executives and
directors for wages, salaries and commissions could be likened to
equitable subordination but no showing of inequitable conduct is
required nor is there any limitation of the subordination of such
229. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(1)(F).
230. Id.
231. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(a)-(c).
232. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(1)(H).
233. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b).
234. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(1).
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claims to the harm caused. 235 The subordination in subparagraph
(G) is, however, consistent with the purpose under § 5386(4) that
senior executives and directors having responsibility for the fi-
nancial condition of the financial company bear losses consistent
with their responsibility rather than their inequitable conduct.236
B. Priority of Post-Receivership Financing Indebtedness and
Unsecured Claims of the United States
The FDIC may obtain credit or take on debt on behalf of a cov-
ered financial company if it is "unable to obtain unsecured credit
for the covered financial company from commercial sources."2 17 All
administrative expenses are subordinate to this commercially ob-
tained credit or debt.238
This may be likened to the superpriority administrative ex-
pense claims often given to lenders that provide debtor in posses-
sion financing in cases under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.219 Proposed Rule section 380.21 makes clear that repayment
of unsecured debt incurred by the FDIC under § 5390(b)(2) will
have priority over all other administrative expenses.2 40
Under § 5390(b)(3), unsecured claims of the United States have
priority over liabilities of the covered financial company that
count as regulatory capital.241
C. Treatment of Claims of Similarly Situated Creditors and
Additional Payments
1. Creditors Similarly Situated
Section 5390(b)(4) provides that all claimants that are similarly
situated under paragraph (1) are to be "treated in a similar man-
ner, except that the [FDIC] may take any action (including mak-
235. Id. § 5390(b)(1)(G).
236. Id. § 5386(4).
237. Id. § 5390(b)(2).
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Monarch Air Serv., Inc. v. Solow (In re Midway Airlines, Inc.), 383 F.3d
663, 669 (7th Cir. 2004).
240. Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,340 (proposed Mar. 23,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
241. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(3).
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ing payments subject to subsection (o)(1)(D)(i))" that would treat
claims of similarly situated creditors differently if:
(A) the [FDIC] determines that such action is necessary-
(i) to maximize the value of the assets of the covered financial
company;
(ii) to initiate and continue operations essential to implementa-
tion of the receivership or any bridge financial company;
(iii) to maximize the present value return from the sale or oth-
er disposition of the assets of the covered financial company; or
(iv) to minimize the amount of any loss realized upon the sale
or other disposition of the assets of the covered financial com-
pany; and
(B) all claimants that are similarly situated under [§ 5390(b)(1)] re-
ceive not less than the amount provided in [§ 5390(d)(2) or (d)(3) as
applicable].242
The reference to "[aill claimants ... similarly situated under [§
5390(b)(1)]" indicates that this provision applies only to the
treatment of unsecured creditors or the undersecured portion of a
secured claim and that the amount received is to be compared
against the amount such claimant would receive based on the
priorities in § 5390(b)(1). 243 The reference in subsection (b)(4)(B) to
§ 5390(d)(2) requires that similarly situated claimants receive no
less than they would in a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code.214
242. Id. § 5390(b)(4). Notably, the FDIC is given the right to recoup or clawback any
such payments if such payments "are necessary to pay in full the obligations issued by the
[FDIC] to the Secretary ... within 60 months of the date of issuance of [the] obligations."
Id. § 5390(o)(1)(B) (referring to id. § 5390(o)(1)(D)). Such clawback is limited to the differ-
ence between the amount the creditor was paid and the amount it would have received
"solely from the proceeds of the liquidation of the covered financial company under [Title
II]." Id. § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i)(I)-(II). Both § 5390(b)(4) and § 5390(h)(5)(E) require that simi-
larly situated creditors receive no less than the amount they would receive under §
5390(d)(2) (i.e., under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, in the case that the financial
company is eligible to be a debtor). See id. § 5390(b)(4)(B), (h)(5)(E)(ii), (d)(2). It is unclear
how that may be determined at the time of the additional payment, since such payment is
likely to be made at the outset of the case. It is possible, however, that the FDIC may con-
tend that Chapter 7 would involve a "disorderly liquidation" and that an orderly liquida-
tion under Title II will preserve greater value for creditors than a Chapter 7, as may be
the case where the transfer of qualified financial contracts to a bridge financial company
or third party may forestall claims arising from early termination of those contracts. On
the other hand, creditors might counter that they would receive a greater recovery under
Chapter 7 because sales of assets might generate a higher price in an open auction process
or the different priority of their claim under the Bankruptcy Code would result in a great-
er recovery on their claim than that under Title II.
243. Id. § 5390(b)(4).
244. Id. § 5390(b)(4)(B) (referencing § 5390(d)(2)). The reference to § 5390(d)(3) applies
to the treatment of certain claims under SIPA.
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However, in the event that the proceeds from the liquidation of
the covered financial company are insufficient to pay higher rank-
ing claims, the amounts paid pursuant to § 5390(b)(4)(B) will be
subject to recoupment under § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i).2 45 Two other provi-
sions also allow certain creditors to be paid more than other simi-
larly situated creditors holding claims of equal priority.214
2. Additional Payments Permitted
Section 5390(d)(4)(A) provides that the FDIC:
may make additional payments or credit additional amounts to, or
with respect to, or for the account of, any claimant or category of
claimants of the covered financial company, if the [FDIC] determines
that such payments or credits are necessary or appropriate to mi-
nimize losses to the [FDIC] as receiver from the orderly liquidation
of the covered financial company. 247
Such payments may be made to claimants or credited "to a com-
pany other than a covered financial company or a bridge financial
company established with respect thereto in order to induce such
other company to accept liability for such claims."248 Such pay-
ments, however, are subject to the limitations that they may not
exceed the "face value" amount of a proven claim 249 and the
FDIC's rights to make assessments to claw back any amounts
paid in excess of what the creditor would have received from the
FDIC "on such claim solely from the proceeds of the liquidation of
the covered financial company under Title II."250 Section
245. Id. §5390(o)(1)(D)(i); see infra note 250 and accompanying text for a further dis-
cussion of § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i).
246. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(d)(4)(A), (h)(5)(E).
247. Id. § 5390(d)(4)(A).
248. Id. § 5390(d)(4)(C).
249. Id. § 5390(d)(4)(B)(i). The "face value" amount indicates that no premium is to be
paid on the claim. Thus, a creditor may receive payment in full of the proven claim even
though other creditors holding claims of the same priority receive far less than the face
amount of their claims.
250. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i). The language "solely from the proceeds of the liquidation of
the covered financial company" in § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i)(II) suggests that the amount so de-
termined to be assessed might be different than what would be received in a liquidation
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code because what is realized by a creditor from the
proceeds of the liquidation under the priority scheme of § 5390(b)(1) may be less than
what would be received by the creditor under Chapter 7. See id. § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i)(II); see
also supra notes 202-218 and accompanying text. This too should be clarified by regula-




5390(d)(4) makes clear that the fact that certain creditors receive
additional payments does not entitle other similarly situated
creditors to payments in excess of their statutory priority, "any
other provision of Federal or State law, or the Constitution of any
State" notwithstanding.251
3. Treatment of Similarly Situated Creditors by Bridge
Financial Companies
Section 5390(h)(5)(E), entitled "equitable treatment of similarly
situated creditors," has a requirement similar to that in §
5390(b)(4) regarding transfer to a bridge financial company of any
assets or liabilities of the covered financial company.52 It requires
that, in connection with the exercise by the FDIC of its rights to
transfer assets and liabilities of a covered financial company to
one or more bridge financial companies, a bridge financial com-
pany treat creditors similarly situated under § 5390(b)(1) in a
similar manner. 25 3 The FDIC, however, may take any action, in-
cluding making payments in respect of such creditor's claim, sub-
ject to rights of recoupment under § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i), that does not
comply with that requirement if
(i) the [FDIC] determines that such action is necessary-
(I) to maximize the value of the assets of the covered financial
company;
(II) to maximize the present value return from the sale or other
disposition of the assets of the covered financial company; or
(III) to minimize the amount of any loss realized upon the sale
or other disposition of the assets of the covered financial com-
pany; and
(ii) all creditors that are similarly situated under [§ 5390(b)(1)] re-
ceive not less than the amount provided under [§ 5390(d)(2) or
210(d)(3) .]254
4. Interim Final Rule Concerning Treatment of Similarly
Situated Creditors
One of the first issues that the FDIC sought to address by way
of regulation is the treatment of similarly situated unsecured
251. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(d)(4)(B)(ii).
252. See id. § 5390(h)(5)(E).
253. Id.
254. Id. § 5390(h)(5)(E)(i)-(ii).
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creditors. The FDIC recently issued an Interim Final Rule ("Inte-
rim Final Rule"), section 380.2 of which identifies the types of
general and senior liability claims that will not be eligible to re-
ceive special treatment under § 5390(b)(4), 5390(d)(4) and 5390
(h)(5)(E).255 The Interim Final Rule became effective on January
25, 2011.256 The supplementary information section accompanying
the Interim Final Rule indicates that the exercise of the discre-
tionary right to pay similarly situated creditors differently is to
be utilized by the FDIC to maintain essential operations under
Title II, since it would be expected that such action could "minim-
ize losses and maximize recoveries in any liquidation, while
avoiding a disorderly collapse." 62 Examples given of what may be
considered essential to the implementation of the receivership or
a bridge financial company include "the payment of utility and
other service contracts and contracts with companies that provide
payments processing services."25 It is suggested that these con-
tracts are necessary to allow the bridge financial company to
maximize the value of the assets of the receivership. The supple-
mentary information section further notes that "[a]ssets and op-
erations that are necessary to maximize the value in the liquida-
tion or prevent a disorderly collapse can be continued seamlessly
through the bridge financial company" since such contracts "can-
255. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4215 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 380.2).
256. Id. at 4208.
257. Id. at 4211.
258. Id. These payments appear to be similar to payments to "critical vendors" allowed
under case law interpreting § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Corner Home
Care, Inc., 438 B.R. 122, 126 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2010) (discussing the various views on pre-
payments of unsecured claims under § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code). But see, In re
Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2004) (vacating a critical-vendor order en-
tered by the lower court, stating "preferential payments to a class of creditors are proper
only if the record shows the prospect of benefit to other creditors'). Title II does not have a
provision comparable to § 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, which treats as an adminis-
trative expense "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the
date of commencement of a case under [the Bankruptcy Code] in which the goods have
been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's business." 11 U.S.C. §
503(b)(9) (2006). Presumably that is because the primary functions of a financial company
do not involve the purchase of goods for use in manufacturing or for resale. Nonetheless,
financial companies also buy goods and several cases have held that what constitutes a
good may be determined with reference to the definition of goods in section 2-105(1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code. E.g., In re Erving Industries, Inc., 432 B.R. 354, 365-66, 370
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (holding that "the appropriate meaning of goods under § 503(b)(9)
[of the Bankruptcy Code] corresponds with the meaning given to that term in § 2-105(1) of
the UCC" and that electricity is a "good" within this definition).
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not be terminated simply because they are assumed by the bridge
financial company."259 The FDIC has authority to require con-
tracting parties to continue to perform if the contracts are needed
to continue the operations transferred to the bridge financial
company, so long as the bridge financial company continues to
perform.260
As to additional payments under § 5390(b)(4), 5390(d)(4) and
5390(h)(E)(5), Interim Final Rule section 380.2 would distinguish
between "long-term senior debt," defined as "senior debt issued by
the covered financial company to bondholders or other creditors
that has a term of more than 360 days,"26 1 and short-term unse-
cured debt. Interim Final Rule section 380.2 provides that long-
term senior debt would "not include partially funded, revolving or
other open lines of credit that are necessary to continuing opera-
tions essential to the receivership or any bridge financial compa-
ny, nor to any contracts to extend credit enforced by the receiver
under section 5390(c)(13)(D)."2 62 As noted above, § 5390(c)(13)(D)
permits the FDIC to enforce any contract to extend lines of credit
to the covered financial company and agree to repay the lender
under the credit agreement as an administrative expense.63
Moreover, to the extent that a line of credit is secured, the se-
cured creditor should be entitled to recover the amount of its se-
cured claim equal to the value of its collateral ahead of all admin-
istrative claims. 26 4 The supplementary information section to the
Proposed Rule that preceded the Interim Final Rule notes that
continuation of lines of credit may be more efficient and "reduce
the demands for funding from the Orderly Liquidation Fund."265
259. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. at 4209.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 4215.
262. See id.
263. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(13)(D) (West 2011). To the extent that the FDIC cannot ob-
tain unsecured credit from commercial sources it "may obtain credit or incur debt on [be-
half] of [a] covered financial company" from commercial sources that will "have priority
over any or all administrative expenses of the receiver under [§ 5390(b)(1)(A)]." Id. §
5390(b)(1)(A), (b)(2). By contrast, under § 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 7 trus-
tee or debtor in possession may not assume or assign any executory contract-that is to
make a loan or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations-to or for the
benefit of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c).
264. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(5).
265. Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,178 (pro-
posed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
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Interim Final Rule section 380.2 provides that the FDIC, when
exercising its discretion under § 5390(b)(4), 5390(d)(4), or
5390(h)(5)(E) to pay certain creditors is not to exercise such au-
thority in a manner that would result in payment of:
(1) [h]olders of long-term senior debt who have a claim entitled to
priority of payment . . . under 12 U.S.C. 5390(b)(1)(E); (2) [h]olders of
subordinated debt who have a claim entitled to priority of pay-
ment ... under 12 U.S.C. 5390(b)(1)(F); (3) [slhareholders, members,
general partners, limited partners, or other persons who have a
claim entitled to priority of payment .. . under 12 U.S.C.
5390(b)(1)(H); or (4) [o]ther holders of claims entitled to priority of
payment ... under 12 U.S.C. 5390(b)(1)(E) [i.e., general and senior
unsecured claims] unless the [FDIC], through the affirmative vote of
a majority the members of the Board of Directors then serving, and
in its sole discretion, specifically determines that additional pay-
ments or credit amounts to such holders are necessary and meet all
of the requirements under § 5390(b)(4), (d)(4), or (h)(5)(E), as appli-
cable.266
Interim Final Rule section 380.2 also provides that the FDIC
board's authority to make such a determination "cannot be dele-
gated."267
However, the supplementary information section of the Interim
Final Rule notes that the distinction between long-term senior
debt and other debt does not mean that short-term debt will be
provided with additional payments under § 5390(b)(4), 5390(d)(4)
or 5390(h)(5)(E).26 It simply gives the FDIC as receiver authority
to make such additional payments. 269 Much attention was given to
Proposed Rule section 380.2 and those who provided comments,
in response to the Proposed Rule, expressed concern that know-
ledge by market participants that short-term unsecured debt may
receive additional payments while long-term senior debt may not,
will mean that financial companies will be unable to attract long-
term debt when they would need it most or, at least, at a reason-
able price.270 It was consequently suggested that the Proposed
Rule might result in lenders limiting loans to short-term debt and
266. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4215 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 380).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 4211.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 4212.
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thereby hasten a financial company's need for governmental in-
tervention and, ultimately, the appointment of the FDIC as re-
ceiver pursuant to Title 11.271
The supplementary information section to the Interim Final
Rule makes clear that as general creditors, holders of short-term
debt "normally will receive the amount established and due under
section [5390(b)(1)], or other priorities of payment specified by
law."272 The supplementary information section further indicates
that "[w]hile holders of shorter term debt may receive additional
payments, [such payments] will be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis" and the FDIC Board must "determine that [such] addition-
al payments or credit amounts are necessary and meet all re-
quirements under [5390](b)(4), (d)(4) or (h)(5)(E), as applicable."2 73
D. Treatment of Secured Claims
Section 5390(b)(5) provides that the priorities provided under §
5390(b) will "not affect secured claims or security entitlements in
respect of assets or property held by the covered financial compa-
ny, except to the extent ... [of] the difference between the
[amount of] the claim and the amount realized from the securi-
ty."7
The formulation "amount realized from the security" suggests
that the value of collateral securing a claim will be determined by
what is ultimately realized from the sale or other disposition of
the security.71 However, the value of collateral may be deter-
mined on an expedited basis pursuant to § 5390(a)(5) or under the
general claim determination procedures under § 5390(a)(3), and it
appears that nothing precludes determinations of value being
made by the FDIC as receiver without a sale of the collateral hav-
ing occurred (subject to challenge by the secured creditor). 276
271. Public Comment from Gus Sauter, Managing Dir. and Chief Inv. Officer, Van-
guard, to Robert Feldman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Nov. 8, 2010), available at http://www.
fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/20l0/l0c07Orderliq.PDF.
272. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4211 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 380).
273. Id.
274. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(5) (West 2011).
275. See id.
276. See id. § 5390(a)(3), (5).
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Moreover, § 5390(a)(3)(D)(ii), which addresses payments to un-
dersecured creditors, speaks in terms of the "fair market value" of
property securing an undersecured claim rather than the
"amount realized."277
Interim Final Rule section 380.2 also provides that "[p]roven
claims secured by a legally valid and enforceable or perfected se-
curity interest or security entitlement in any property or other
assets of the covered financial company shall be paid or satisfied
in full to the extent of such collateral. "278 However, to the extent
that a claim exceeds "the fair market value of such property or
other assets," it is to be "treated as an unsecured claim and paid
in accordance with the priorities in [§ 5390(b)] and otherwise ap-
plicable provisions."219 The only guidance that the Interim Final
Rule gives with respect to valuation of assets is that the "fair
market value [of collateral is to] be determined as of the date the
[FDIC] was appointed receiver of the covered financial compa-
ny."280 The FDIC seeks comment on whether the date of appoint-
ment of the FDIC as receiver should "be used as the valuation
date for all types of collateral, or only government securities or
other publicly traded securities." 28 1 It also seeks comment on
"[w]hat additional guidelines would be useful in creating certain-
ty with respect to establishment of [the] fair market value of var-
ious types of collateral for secured claims." 282
It appears that where there is a sale, a sale will determine val-
ue. Proposed Rule section 380.54 would have the lien of a secured
creditor attach to the proceeds of a sale of the collateral and the
proceeds would be "remitted to the claimant within a reasonable
time after sale."283 However, Proposed Rule section 380.55, which
gives the FDIC a right of redemption of a security interest, does
so based on the "fair market value" of the property subject to the
security interest, indicating that different means of valuation of a
277. Id. § 5390(a)(3)(D)(ii).
278. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform




281. Id. at 4214.
282. Id.
283. Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,345 (proposed Mar. 23,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
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secured claim will apply depending on the circumstances.28 4 How
value is determined by the FDIC where there is no sale of the se-
curity remains unknown.
VIII. RIGHTS OF RECEIVER WITH RESPECT To EXISTING
CONTRACTS AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS
A. Rights of Repudiation and Disaffirmance of Contracts and
Leases Generally
Sections 5390(c)(1) and (2) provide the FDIC with authority to
repudiate or disaffirm "any contract or lease to which the finan-
cial company is a party" within a reasonable period of time where
continued performance is too burdensome and it would "promote
the orderly administration of the affairs of the covered financial
company."28 5 Unlike § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires
that for a contract or lease to be assumed or rejected, it must be
"executory,"286 i.e., that there remain unperformed obligations by
both parties to the contract .2  There is no such requirement un-
der Title II for a contract or lease to be repudiated or disaf-
firmed. 288
As under the FDIA, with few exceptions2 8 damages for disaf-
firmance or repudiation of a contract are "actual direct compensa-
284. Id.
285. Id. § 5390(c)(1)-(2).
286. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006). The term "rejection" under the Bankruptcy Code is
comparable to "repudiation" under Title II. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), with 12 U.S.C.A. §
5390(c). Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code contains many protections for nondebtor
counterparties to executory contracts not only with respect to rejection but also assump-
tion and assignment of executory contracts that are not provided in Title II. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 365(b), (0 (requiring the curing of defaults and adequate assurance of future per-
formance for assumption or assignment of an executory contract or lease). In a case under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, § 365(d)(1) deems rejected any lease or executory con-
tract that is not assumed or rejected within 60 days after the order for relief, unless the
bankruptcy court extends the time for cause. Id. § 365(d)(1). However, the only timing re-
quirement under § 5390(c)(2) is that a contract or lease be repudiated or disaffirmed "with-
in a reasonable period of time." 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(2).
287. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 652 (9th ed. 2009).
288. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(1) (providing that the FDIC as receiver may disaffirm or
repudiate any contract or lease) (emphasis added).
289. Special provisions apply with respect to the measure of damages for the repudia-
tion of (i) "qualified financial contracts" as defined in § 5390(c)(8)(D), (ii) debt obligations,
and (iii) contingent obligations, as well as leases as to which the covered financial compa-
ny is lessee or lessor and contracts for the sale of real property. Id. § 5390(c)(3)(C)-(E),
(c)(4)-(5); see also id. § 5390(c)(8)(D)(i) (defining the term qualified financial contracts).
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tory damages ... determined as of the date of the appointment of
the [FDIC] as receiver[,]" or in the case of any qualified financial
contract, as of "the date of the disaffirmance or repudiation of
such contract or agreement."2 90 The claim for damages "does not
include punitive or exemplary damages, damages for lost profits
or opportunity, or damages for pain and suffering."291
B. Measure of Damages for Certain Contracts and Leases
1. Measure of Damages for Repudiation or Disaffirmance of Debt
Obligations
If the FDIC repudiates any debt obligations "for borrowed
money or evidenced by a security, actual direct compensatory
damages shall be no less than the amount lent plus accrued in-
terest plus any accreted original issue discount as of the date the
[FDIC] was appointed receiver." 292 Additionally, a secured creditor
will be entitled to payment of accrued interest on its allowed se-
cured claim to the date of repudiation "to the extent that an al-
lowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which is
greater than the amount of such claim and any accrued inter-
est."2M
290. Id. § 5390(c)(3)(A)(ii). Section 5390(c)(8)(D)(i) defines "qualified financial contract"
as "any securities contract, commodity contract, forward contract, repurchase agreement,
swap agreement and any similar agreement that the [FDIC] determines by regulation,
resolution, or order to be a qualified financial contract for purposes of [paragraph (D) of §
5390(c)(8)." Id. § 5390(c)(8)(D)(i).
291. Id. § 5390(c)(3)(B).
292. Id. § 5390(c)(3)(D). Under the Bankruptcy Code, debt obligations may not be re-
jected because they are not executory in nature, since the purchaser of the debt obligation
will have fulfilled all of its performance obligations upon payment for the debt. See 11
U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006).
293. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(3)(D). Proposed Rule section 380.52(a) clarifies that repudia-
tion of a contract secured by property "shall not be construed as permitting avoidance of
any legally enforceable and perfected security interest in the property." The security inter-
est will instead "be deemed to secure any claim for repudiation damages." Proposed Rule
section 380.52(b) further provides that "the [FDIC] ... may consent to the exercise of any
legal or contractual rights against the property, including liquidation, for the purpose of
applying the value of the property or its proceeds up to the amount of the allowed claim for
damages." Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,344 (proposed Mar. 23,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
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2. Measure of Damages for Repudiation or Disaffirmance of
Qualified Financial Contracts
In the case of repudiation or disaffirmance of qualified financial
contracts under Title II, damages for disaffirmance or repudiation
will be limited to actual direct compensatory damages, which "in-
clude normal and reasonable costs of cover or other reasonable
measures of damages utilized in the industries for such contract"
determined as of the date of disaffirmance or repudiation.29 4 In
exercising its rights of disaffirmance or repudiation of any quali-
fied financial contract, the FDIC is required to either:
(A) disaffirm or repudiate all qualified financial contracts be-
tween . . . (i) any person or any affiliate of such person; and (ii) the
covered financial company in default; or (B) ... none of the qualified
financial contracts . . . (with respect to such person or any affiliate of
such person). 95
3. Measure of Damages for Repudiation or Disaffirmance of
Contingent Obligation
The FDIC may, by rule or regulation, prescribe that:
In the case of any contingent obligation of a covered financial com-
pany consisting of any obligation under a guarantee, letter of credit,
loan commitment, or similar credit obligation . .. actual direct com-
pensatory damages shall be no less than the estimated value of the
claim as of the date the [FDIC] was appointed receiver of the covered
financial company, [and that] such value is measured based on the
likelihood that [the] contingent claim would become fixed and the
probable magnitude thereof. 96
Unlike the FDIA, which does not provide for the payment of
contingent claims, 297 but like the Bankruptcy Code, Title II recog-
nizes the right to prove contingent claims. The term "claim" is de-
fined in § 5381(a)(4) of Title II as "any right to payment, whether
294. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(3)(C).
295. Id. § 5390(c)(11).
296. Id. § 5390(c)(3)(E).
297. Section 1821(e) of the FDIA, which relates to contracts entered into before the ap-
pointment of a receiver, does not have a provision comparable to § 5390(c)(3)(E), which
provides for damages arising from repudiation of contingent obligations. See 12 U.S.C. §
1821(e).
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or not such right is . .. conting t," similar to the manner in
which "claim" is defined in § 101(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.291
In Interim Final Rule section 380.4, the FDIC addresses the
provability of contingent claims under Title II. The supplementa-
ry information section indicates that the text of the Proposed
Rule was revised in response to comments that the Proposed Rule
was ambiguous and to clarify that the treatment of contingent
claims under Title II parallels their treatment under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 299 Interim Final Rule section 380.4, paragraph (a)
provides that the FDIC may not disallow a claim "solely because
the obligation [of the covered financial company] is contingent.""o
It further provides that "To the extent [an] obligation is contin-
gent, the [FDIC] shall estimate the value of the claim. . . based
upon the likelihood that [the] contingent obligation would become
fixed and the probable magnitude [of the claim] ."301 The supple-
mentary information section notes that § 502(c) of the Bankrupt-
cy Code "requires estimation of any claim the liquidation of which
would unduly delay the administration of the estate."302 Neither
the Bankruptcy Code nor the Interim Final Rule specifies a time
by which a contingent claim should be estimated.303 However, the
FDIC has solicited comments regarding whether it "should desig-
nate a specific time during the receivership for the estimation of
contingent claims."304 Under paragraph (b) of Interim Final Rule
section 380.4, if the FDIC repudiates a "guarantee, letter of cre-
dit, loan commitment, or similar credit obligation" that is contin-
gent as of the date of the receiver's appointment, "the actual di-
rect compensatory damages for repudiation shall be no less than
the estimated value of the claim as of the date the [FDIC] was
appointed receiver of the covered financial company.""o, Interim
298. Compare id. § 5381(a)(4) (defining the term "claim" as inclusive of contingent
rights to payment), with 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2006) (defining the term "claim" as inclu-
sive of contingent rights to payment).
299. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4213 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 380).
300. Id. at 4216.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 4213 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)).
303. See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 502(c).
304. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. at 4213. The claim deter-
mination procedures in § 5390(a)(2)-(5) do not provide for estimation of contingent claims
and would appear to apply to all claims. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(2)-(5) (West 2011).
305. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. at 4216.
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Final Rule section 380.4 reiterates the language of §
5390(c)(3)(E), stating that the "value is measured based upon the
likelihood that such contingent claim would become fixed and the
probable magnitude thereof," but provides no guidance as to how
such measurement is to be made.306
4. Damages for Repudiation or Disaffirmance of Leases Under
Which the Covered Financial Company is the Lessee
Damages for disaffirmance or repudiation of leases307 in which
the covered financial company is the lessee will include post-
receivership contractual rent accruing to "the later of the date
[that] notice of disaffirmance or repudiation is mailed; or the dis-
affirmance or repudiation becomes effective, unless the lessor is
in default of the lease."o30 The lessor is not entitled to "damages
under any acceleration clause or other penalty provision" and its
claim for pre-receivership rent will be limited to a "claim for any
unpaid rent, subject to all appropriate offsets and defenses, due
as of the date of the appointment of the receiver."ao9 Accordingly, a
lessor of nonresidential real property or of other real or personal
property that is repudiated under Title II would likely have a
significantly smaller unsecured claim than it would have if its
claim were rejected under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 310
5. Damages for Repudiation or Disaffirmance of Leases Under
Which the Covered Financial Company is the Lessor
In the case of leases for real property under which the covered
financial company is the lessor and where the lessee is not in de-
306. Id.; 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(3)(E).
307. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(4). Section 5390(c)(4) does not distinguish between leases of
real and personal property and would appear to apply to both. See id.
308. Id. § 5390(c)(4)(B)(i).
309. Id. § 5390(c)(4)(B)(ii)-(iii).
310. Damages for repudiation of a lease of nonresidential real property would be less
than damages for rejection of such lease under the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to §
502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, the lessor of such rejected lease would have an adminis-
trative claim for any unpaid post-filing date rent accrued to the date of rejection, as well
as a general unsecured claim for pre-petition accrued unpaid rent and unaccrued post-
petition rent subject to the cap provided under the same section. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6)
(2006). Under the Bankruptcy Code, there is no cap on the damages arising from the rejec-
tion of a lease of personal property. Id. § 365(d)(5).
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fault as of the date of repudiation, the lessee "may either (i) treat
the lease as terminated by such repudiation; (ii) or remain in pos-
session of the leasehold interest for the balance of the term of the
lease, unless the lessee defaults ... after the date of such repudi-
ation.",', The provisions of § 5390(c)(5) relating to real property
leases for which the covered financial company is lessor, includ-
ing the obligation to pay contractual rent and rights of offset, are
similar to the rights and obligations of the lessor and lessee of
real property under § 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code."'2
C. Repudiation or Disaffirmance of Contracts for Sale of Real
Property and Service Contracts
Title II also has provisions relating to repudiation of contracts
for sale of real property and with respect to service contracts.3 1 1 In
the case of service contracts, any claim for services rendered be-
fore the appointment of the FDIC will be "deemed to have arisen
[on] the date ... the receiver was appointed" and will be treated
as an unsecured claim.314 If the receiver accepts services from the
provider after its appointment, the party will be paid for pre-
repudiation services and the amount will be treated as an admin-
istrative expense.315 However, acceptance by the FDIC as receiver
of such services will "not affect the right of the [FDIC] to repu-
diate [the] contract at any time after such performance ."316
311. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(5).
312. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1), with 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(5).
313. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(6)-(7).
314. Id. § 5390(c)(7)(A).
315. Id. § 5390(c)(7)(B); see also Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4215 (Jan. 25,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
316. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(7)(C). Interim Final Rule section 380.3 addresses personal
service agreements with employees (including collective bargaining agreements). Orderly
Liquidation Authority Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. at 4215. "Personal service agreement" is
defined in section 380.3(a)(1) as "a written agreement between an employee and a covered
financial company, covered subsidiary or a bridge financial company setting forth the
terms of employment." Id. Section 380.3(c) of the Interim Final Rule clarifies that a per-
sonal service agreement does not continue to apply to employees in connection with a sale
or transfer of a subsidiary or certain operations or assets of the covered financial company
unless such agreement is expressly assumed by the acquiring party. Id. at 4216. Section
380.3(e) makes clear that payment of employees does not apply to "senior executives" (as
defined in Interim Final Rule section 380.3(a)(2)) or directors of the covered financial com-
pany, nor does a personal service agreement impair the ability of the FDIC to recover
compensation from such senior executives or directors. Id.; see also id. at 4215 (defining
the term "senior executive" under Interim Final Rule section 380.3(a)(2)).
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D. Enforcement of Contracts of a Covered Financial Company
and Contracts Guaranteed by a Covered Financial Company
1. Enforcement of Contracts of a Covered Financial Company
As a general matter under § 5390(c)(13), the FDIC may enforce
any contract of a covered financial company for which it is the re-
ceiver,
notwithstanding any provision of the contract providing for termina-
tion, default, acceleration, or exercise of rights upon, or solely by
reason of, insolvency, the appointment of . .. the [FDIC] as receiver,
the filing of the petition pursuant to [§] 5382(a)(1) of [Title II], or the
issuance of the recommendations or determination, or any actions or
events occurring in connection
with a systemic risk determination under § 5383.3" This power
excludes liability insurance contracts for directors or officers and
financial institution bonds but does not affect the FDIC's rights
under other applicable law with respect to those contracts."'
A contract provision providing for termination, default, or acce-
leration by reason of insolvency, the appointment of the FDIC as
receiver, or another similar triggering event is referred to as an
ipso facto clause. 9 Except as otherwise provided by § 5390, dur-
ing the ninety-day period beginning the date of appointment of
the FDIC as receiver, no person may use any ipso facto clause
triggers, including (i) the insolvency of the financial company, (ii)
the appointment of the receiver, or (iii) similar circumstances, "to
terminate, accelerate, or declare a default under any contract to
which a covered financial company is a party, ... or to obtain
possession of or exercise control over any property of the covered
financial company or affect [the company's] contractual rights ...
without the consent of the [FDIC] ."32
Section 5390(c)(13)(C)(ii) excepts the rights of counterparties to
qualified financial contracts to terminate, liquidate, or accelerate
such contracts in accordance with § 5390(c)(8)(A) and to net quali-
fied financial contracts pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insur-
317. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(13)(A). But see id. § 5390(c)(8)(A), (F) (concerning the rights
of early termination and acceleration applicable to qualified financial contracts).
318. Id. § 5390(c)(13)(A)-(B).
319. "Ipso facto clause" is defined as "A contract clause that specifies the consequences
of a party's bankruptcy." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 905 (9th ed. 2009).
320. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(13)(C)(i).
2011]1 1203
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ance Corporation Improvement Act ("FDICIA") from the ninety
day limitation.321
2. Contracts to Extend Credit
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitations, "if the [FDIC] as re-
ceiver enforces any contract to extend credit to the covered finan-
cial company or bridge financial company," the FDIC is required
to pay "any valid and enforceable obligation to repay such
debt . . . as an administrative expense of the receivership."3 22
3. Enforcement of Contracts Guaranteed by the Covered
Financial Company
The powers of the FDIC extend not only to enforcement of the
obligations of covered subsidiaries but also to contracts of subsid-
iaries and affiliates, whose obligations are guaranteed, supported
by, or linked to the covered financial company. In the case that
the obligations of a subsidiary or affiliate are guaranteed or oth-
erwise supported by or linked to the covered financial company,
the obligee of any such contract may be precluded from exercising
any contractual rights of "termination, liquidation, or acceleration
of such contracts, based solely on" an ipso facto clause.323 This will
be the case if:
(i) such guaranty or other support and all related assets and liabilities
are transferred to and assumed by a bridge financial company or a third
party (other than a third party for which a conservator, receiver, trustee
in bankruptcy or other legal custodian has been appointed, or which is
otherwise the subject of a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding) no later
than 5:00 p.m. on the business day next succeeding the appointment of
the FDIC as receiver of such covered financial company, or (ii) the
FDIC, as receiver, otherwise provides adequate protection with respect
to such obligations.2
This provision gives the FDIC authority, subject to the terms
of § 5390(c)(16), to enforce contracts of solvent subsidiaries that
do not meet the criteria necessary to qualify as a "covered subsid-
321. Id. § 5390(c)(13)(C)(ii) (referencing 12 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4405 (2006)).
322. Id. § 5930(c)(13)(D). Compare id., with 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) providing that debtors
in possession or trustees may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor if "such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt fi-
nancing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor").




iary" so the FDIC may avoid liability on claims guaranteed or
otherwise supported by or linked to the covered financial compa-
ny.32 5 There is no provision in Title II comparable to § 361 of the
Bankruptcy Code that specifies what constitutes "adequate pro-
tection" of an interest of an entity in property of the debtor.3 11 It
would be helpful if a regulation indicated what would constitute
adequate protection of guaranty rights, including where the gua-
ranty is not secured by property of the guarantor or a third par-
ty.327
E. Treatment of Qualified Financial Contracts
The provisions of Title II with respect to qualified financial
contracts are similar to the provisions of the FDIA governing
such contracts. The definition of the terms "qualified financial
contract," "securities contract," "commodity contract," "forward
contract," "repurchase agreement," and "swap agreement" follow
the definitions of those terms in the FDIA.32 8 As previously dis-
cussed, special provisions apply to the repudiation of qualified fi-
nancial contracts and the enforcement of the counterparty's
rights of early termination and close-out netting under such con-
tracts.329 These special provisions are created in recognition of the
"safe harbors" provided for such contracts under the FDIA, the
Bankruptcy Code and FDICIA due to the systemic importance of
qualified financial contracts to the United States financial mar-
kets 330
Subject to the rights of the FDIC as receiver to transfer quali-
fied financial contracts under § 5390(c)(9) and (10), § 5390(c)
(8)(A) permits the exercise by a counterparty of:
325. Id.
326. See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 361.
327. A regulation setting forth what constitutes adequate protection would also be
helpful because § 5390(h)(16)(D), governing the authority of a bridge financial company to
obtain credit, requires a showing of "adequate protection" as a requirement for priming
the lien of a secured creditor. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(h)(16).
328. Compare id. § 5390(c)(8)(D), with 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(i)-(vi) (reflecting sub-
stantially similar definitions).
329. See supra Part VIII.A.
330. See Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bank-
ruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 642 (2005) (noting the view that "safe harbors" are necessary for
the protection of financial markets and that without them "markets might suffer serious
shocks-perhaps even a systemic liquidity crisis, causing markets to collapse-when deb-
tors enter bankruptcy").
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(i) any right that such person has to cause the termination, liquida-
tion, or acceleration of [such contracts] ... ; (ii) any right under any
security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement re-
lated to one or more qualified financial contracts ... ; or (iii) any
right to offset or net out any termination value, payment amount, or
other transfer obligation arising under . .. [one] or more [qualified
financial contracts], including any master agreement for such con-
tracts or agreements.331
However, a counterparty is prohibited from terminating, liqui-
dating, or netting such contracts solely because of insolvency, the
company's financial condition, the appointment of the FDIC as
receiver, or for any reason "incidental to the appointment ... of
the [FDIC] as receiver . .. (I) until 5:00 p.m. (eastern time) on the
business day following the date of the appointment [of the receiv-
er;] or (II) after the person has received notice that the contract
has been transferred pursuant to [§ 5390(c)(9)(A)]." 2
This limitation on the rights of the counterparty to a qualified
financial contract is intended to give the FDIC an opportunity to
sell such contracts to a third party or transfer them to a bridge
financial company in order for the FDIC to preserve value and
limit claims under such contracts (as it may under the FDIA).3 33
There is no similar suspension of rights of early termination, li-
quidation, and acceleration of such contracts under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.334 One of the shortcomings of the Bankruptcy Code
in the Lehman Cases is that the unfettered right of counterpar-
ties to terminate qualified financial contracts upon the occurrence
of an ipso facto event is believed to have caused the loss of as
much as $75 billion in value.3 1
331. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(8)(A).
332. See id. § 5390(c)(10)(B)(i). If no transfer occurs, then rights of early termination
and close-out netting may be exercised by the non-defaulting party. See id. § 5390(c)(8)(A).
333. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4209 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 380) (referring to §5390(c)(10) and stating "As in the FDI Act, derivatives con-
tracts that are needed to continue operations can be transferred to the bridge [financial
company] and cannot be terminated and netted by counterparties. This is an important
tool to avoid market destabilization because, unlike the Bankruptcy Code, it can prevent
the immediate and disorderly liquidation of collateral in a period of market distress").
334. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 555-556, 559-560 (2006) (allowing the exercise of a contrac-
tual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate certain financial contracts).
335. 2010 Bair Statement, supra note 35, at 13; see also Report of Anton R. Valukas,




In addition, § 5390(c)(8)(F)(ii) suspends "the payment or deli-
very obligations otherwise due from a party pursuant to the qual-
ified financial contract" beginning at the time of the FDIC's ap-
pointment as receiver "until the earlier of (I) the time .. . such
party receives notice [pursuant to § 5390(c)(10)(A)] that such con-
tract has been transferred ... ; or (II) 5:00 p.m. (eastern time) on
the business day following ... the appointment of the [FDIC] as
receiver." 336
After 5:00 p.m. on the business day following the appointment
of the FDIC as receiver, the non-defaulting party may exercise
rights of early termination and close-out netting of any qualified
financial contract that has not been sold to a third party or trans-
ferred to a bridge financial company, including the application of
collateral to satisfy its claim.33 However, to the extent the nonde-
faulting counterparty has an unsecured claim as a result of such
early termination, it will be subject to the procedures for deter-
mination and payment of such claims under § 5390(a)(3), (4) and
(7).33 Moreover, to the extent that a qualified financial contract
would suspend, condition, or extinguish the payment obligation of
the non-defaulting counterparty upon an ipso facto clause, such
"walk away" clauses are not enforceable.33 The prohibition of en-
forcing "walkaway" clauses is found in both the FDIA and in §§
403 and 404 of the FDICIA.340 While there is no comparable "wal-
kaway" clause in the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court in
the Lehman Cases held that a creditor may not suspend pay-
ments under a qualified financial contract if it fails to determine
whether to terminate the qualified financial contract and further
held that the non defaulting counterparty must exercise its right
of early termination reasonably promptly after the ipso facto
event.341
In making any transfer of qualified financial contracts, the
FDIC as receiver must either
336. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(8)(F)(ii). As in the case of the comparable provision under
the FDIA, the purpose of this provision is to allow the FDIC to effect the sale of qualified
financial contracts to a third party or the transfer of such contracts to a bridge financial
company in order to avoid losses from the early termination of qualified financial contracts
pending their sale or other disposition. See id. § 5390(a)(1)(B)(iv), (h)(2)(E), (h)(5).
337. See id. §5390(c)(8)(A)(ii).
338. See id. § 5390(a)(3)-(4)(7).
339. Id. § 5390(c)(8)(F)(i).
340. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 4403-4404(h).
341. See Transcript of Hearing, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., No. 08-13555
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2009) (No. 5261).
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(i) transfer ... (I) all qualified financial contracts between any per-
son or any affiliate [thereof] and the covered financial company .. .;
(II) all claims of such person or any affiliate ... against [the] covered
financial company under ... ; (III) all claims of [the] covered finan-
cial company against such person or any affiliate thereof under ...
and (IV) all property securing or any other credit enhancement for
such qualified financial contract to a single financial institution
(other than one that is in receivership or insolvency proceedings),
or "(ii) transfer none of the qualified financial contracts, claims,
property, or other credit enhancement[s]."3 42
IX. AVOIDANCE POWERS OF THE FDIC
A. General Powers and Defenses Applicable to Preferential
Transfers, Fraudulent Transfers, Post Receivership Transfers,
and Setoff
The FDIC has the power under Title II to sue to avoid prefe-
rences, fraudulent transfers, post receivership transfers not au-
thorized by the FDIC as receiver, and improper setoffs.43 These
avoidance powers are substantially similar to those afforded to
Chapter 7 trustees and debtors in possession in liquidations or
reorganizations under Chapter 7 and Chapter 11, respectively, of
the Bankruptcy Code.344 To the extent that any such transfer is
342. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(9)(A). Special provisions apply to the transfer of qualified
financial contracts to a foreign bank, financial institution, or agency thereof and to the
transfer of qualified financial contracts that are cleared by or subject to rules of a clearing
organization. See id. § 5390(c)(9)(B)-(C).
343. See id. § 5390(a)(11)-(12).
344. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-549, 553 (2006). One difference in the terms applicable to the
avoidance of fraudulent transfers for actual fraud under § 5390(a)(11)(A) of Title II from §
548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code is that under § 5390(a)(11)(A) one of the bases for
constructive fraudulent transfer (such as insolvency) is required in addition to proof of ac-
tual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors of the covered financial company. Com-
pare 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(11)(A), with 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1)(A). This difference in lan-
guage may be a typographical error. One difference in the provisions relating to
preferential transfers under the Bankruptcy Code is that the ninety-day period (or the
one-year period for insiders) runs from the time of the appointment of the FDIC as receiv-
er. Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(11)(B), with 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A)-(B). Another dif-
ference with respect to preferential transfers is that a transfer is deemed "made when
such transfer is so perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the covered financial compa-
ny against whom applicable law permits [the] transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an
interest in the property transferred that is superior to [that of] the transferee" (or if per-
fection does not occur prior to the appointment of the receiver, it will be deemed to occur
immediately before the receiver's appointment). 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(11)(H)(i)(II). Section
547(e)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to the "hypothetical lien creditor" standard.
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avoided, the FDIC as receiver "may recover ... property trans-
ferred, or, if a court so orders, the value of such property (at the
time of such transfer) from (i) the initial transferee of such trans-
fer or the person for whose benefit such transfer was made; or (ii)
any immediate or mediate transferee . . .""
The defenses afforded to creditors and their transferees with
respect to such avoidance actions under the Bankruptcy Code are,
for the most part, afforded to creditors and their transferees un-
der Title II. The FDIC may not recover "from (i) any transferee
that takes for value, including in satisfaction of, or to secure, a
present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge
of the voidability of the transfer avoided; or (ii) any immediate or
mediate good faith transferee of such transferee."346 Title II af
fords a "transferee or obligee from which the [FDIC] seeks to re-
cover a transfer or to avoid an obligation" the same defenses to
avoidance and recovery of preferential transfers, fraudulent
transfers, and unauthorized post-receivership transfers as a
transferee or obligee has under §§ 547, 548, and 549 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.347
The FDIC's authority to recover a transfer or avoid an obliga-
tion shall be subject to (i) § 546(b) (timing of post-filing perfection
of an interest in property); (ii) § 546(c) (reclamation); (iii) § 547(c)
(defenses to preferences of contemporaneous exchange for new
value, ordinary course of business, and subsequent new value);
and (iv) § 548(c) (rights of good faith transferee for value) under
the Bankruptcy Code .34
Title II does not incorporate the "safe harbor" language of the
Bankruptcy Code, which precludes a trustee from avoiding trans-
fers with respect to (i) securities contracts, commodity contracts,
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B). Proposed Rule section 380.9 corrects the inconsistent treatment
of transferees under Title II and Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and provides
that the bona fide purchaser standard will apply to fraudulent transfers and preferential
transfers of real property (other than fixtures) and the hypothetical lien creditor standard
will apply to preferential transfers of personal property and fixtures. Orderly Liquidation
Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,330 (proposed Mar. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 380). Section 547(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for a transfer to take place at
the time it takes effect between transferor and transferee if it is perfected within thirty
days after that time. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2). This thirty-day grace period also applies under
Proposed Rule section 380.9. Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,330.
345. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(11)(D)(i)-(ii). Compare id., with 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).
346. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(11)(E). Compare id., with 11 U.S.C. § 550(b).
347. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(11)(F)(i).
348. See id. § 5390(a)(11)(F)(ii); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(b)-(c), 547(c), 548(c).
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or forward contracts; (ii) repurchase agreements; (iii) swap
agreements; and (iv) master netting agreements,'4 and with re-
spect to certain payments and transfers concerning contracts con-
stituting "value" for purposes of § 548.50 However, under a
slightly different approach, the FDIC may not avoid "any transfer
of money or other property in connection with any qualified fi-
nancial contract with a covered financial company" unless "the
transferee had actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud such
company, the creditors of such company ... or the [FDIC] as re-
ceiver [for the covered financial] company."35
B. Treatment of Rights of Setoff
Creditors of a covered financial company retain setoff rights on
terms generally similar to those applicable under the Bankruptcy
Code.' However, a key distinction is that "the [FDIC] as receiv-
er . .. may sell or transfer any assets [to a third party or bridge
financial company] free and clear of the setoff rights of any par-
ty," thereby destroying mutuality.53 Moreover, instead of the
right to setoff being treated as a secured claim (as it is treated
under the Bankruptcy Code), 354 a party whose collateral is sold or
transferred free of setoff rights is limited to a claim ranking be-
low administrative expenses of the receiver, amounts owed to the
United States (unless the United States agrees otherwise), and
wages, salaries, or commissions, and certain employee benefit
amounts owed to employees up to the statutory cap per individual
that are earned not later than 180 days before the appointment of
the FDIC as receiver.355 Therefore, any claim arising from loss of
rights of setoff will have priority immediately above claims of un-
secured creditors that have general and senior liability claims. In
addition, since such setoff rights result in an unsecured claim,
those claims will be subject to the provisions concerning determi-
nation and payment of unsecured claims in § 5390(a)(2)-(7).356
349. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)-(f), (g), (j).
350. Id. § 548(d)(2)(B)-(E).
351. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(8)(C).
352. Compare id. § 5390(a)(12), with 11 U.S.C. § 553.
353. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(12)(F).
354. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
355. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(a)(12)(F).
356. Id. § 5390(a)(2)-(7).
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As noted above, it may be appropriate for a regulation to clarify
whether the requirement under § 5390(a)(7)(B)-that all creditors
receive no less than they would under Chapter 7 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code6.7-will apply to the situation where no funds are availa-
ble from the liquidation of a covered financial company under
Title II to pay a creditor's claims for setoff,358 by providing the
creditor with a recovery equal to that which it would have re-
ceived in a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Anoth-
er difference in the treatment of a right of setoff in a case under
the Bankruptcy Code is that the creditor, whose setoff right is
treated as a secured claim under § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code,
may petition the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay in
order to realize its right of setoff.3' 9 If such creditor succeeds in
having the stay lifted, it may be able to be paid sooner than other
creditors as a result of exercise of its right of setoff.
X. BRIDGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES
A. Formation of and Transfer of Assets and Liabilities to Bridge
Financial Companies
The FDIC, as receiver of one or more covered financial compa-
nies, is empowered to create one or more "bridge financial compa-
nies""'e to succeed to selected assets and liabilities of the covered
financial company as well as rights and privileges of the covered
financial company. 361 A bridge financial company has the authori-
ty to purchase assets, assume liabilities, and perform any of the
functions of a covered financial company as determined by the
FDIC.362 This may be accomplished without notice to, input from,
or consent of any creditors or shareholders and without approval
from any court. 63 The transfer of any assets or liabilities of a cov-
ered financial company to a bridge financial company "(including
[those] associated with any trust or custody business)" is "effec-
tive without any further approval under Federal or State law, as-
357. See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text.
358. Id.
359. See 11 U.S.C. § 506.
360. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(h).
361. Id. § 5390(h)(1)(B), (2)(E)(i).
362. Id. § 5390(h)(1)(B).
363. See id. § 5390(h)(2)(E)(ii).
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signment, or consent with respect thereto."36 4 The FDIC may also
"provide for a bridge financial company to succeed to and assume
any rights, powers, authorities, or privileges of the covered finan-
cial company" and such succession is "effective without any fur-
ther approval under Federal or State law, assignment, or consent
with respect thereto."65
The formation of the bridge financial company ostensibly al-
lows the FDIC to segregate, and continue the operation of, assets
subject to the related liabilities necessary for a viable enterprise.
The bridge financial company is similar to the mechanism availa-
ble to the FDIC under the FDIA, which establishes a bridge
bank,366 and to mechanisms under state laws applicable to insur-
ance company insolvency, which allow the segregation and pre-
servation of good assets for sale or other disposition. 367
B. Management and Funding of Bridge Financial Company
The bridge financial company is to be managed by a board of
directors, appointed by the FDIC, and may follow the corporate
governance rules of the State of Delaware or the state in which
the applicable covered financial company is organized or incorpo-
rated.3 68
The bridge financial company does not need to be funded with
capital or surplus," although the aggregate amount of liabilities
assumed by a bridge financial company "may not exceed the ag-
gregate amount of the assets . . . that are transferred to, or pur-
chased by, the bridge financial company. . . ."70 In addition, "the
[FDIC] may make available to the bridge financial company, sub-
ject to the [orderly liquidation plan provided in § 5390(n)(9)],
funds for the operation of the bridge financial company in lieu of
364. Id. § 5390(h)(5)(A), (D). This contrasts with transfers of assets of a covered finan-
cial company to third parties who are subject to certain antitrust notifications and clear-
ances. Id. § 5390(a)(1)(G)(i)-(ii). However, antitrust notifications and clearances will apply
to a merger of a bridge financial company with, or sale of a bridge financial company's as-
sets to, a third party. Id. § 5390(h)(11).
365. Id. § 5390(h)(2)(E).
366. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n) (2006) (describing the creation of bridge banks).
367. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-15-9 (West 2011).
368. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(h)(2)(B), (F).
369. Id. § 5390(h)(2)(G)(i).
370. Id. § 5390(h)(5)(F).
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capital."3 71 "If the [FDIC] determines such action is advisable, [it]
may cause capital stock or other securities of [the] bridge finan-
cial company . .. to be issued and offered for sale in such amounts
and on such terms and conditions as the [FDIC] may.. . deter-
mine."an1
The FDIC may, subject to the orderly liquidation plan, provide
funding to facilitate mergers or consolidations of bridge financial
companies with other non-bridge financial companies.3 7 1 It may
also facilitate the sale of a majority of the bridge financial compa-
ny's capital stock to another company, or eighty percent or more
of the stock to a person other than the FDIC or another bridge fi-
nancial company. 74 The FDIC also may provide funding for the
assumption "of all or substantially all of the liabilities of the
bridge financial company ... or the acquisition of all or substan-
tially all of the assets of the bridge financial company, [in each
case] by a company that is not a bridge financial company, or oth-
er entity permitted under applicable law."375 In addition, the
FDIC may also provide funding to "facilitate the acquisition by a
bridge financial company of any assets, or the assumption of any
liabilities, of a covered financial company."3 6
A bridge financial company is authorized to "obtain unsecured
credit and issue unsecured debt."377 If it is not able to do so, then
with the approval the FDIC, the bridge financial company may
obtain credit or issue unsecured debt that:
(i) [has] priority over any or all obligations of the bridge financial
company; (ii) [is] secured by a lien on property of the bridge financial
company that is not otherwise subject to a lien; or (iii) [is] secured by
a junior lien on property of the bridge financial company that is sub-
ject to a lien.3 78
371. Id. § 5390(h)(2)(G)(iv).
372. Id. § 5390(h)(2)(G)(iii).
373. Id. § 5390(h)(9), (13)(A).
374. Id. § 5390(h)(9), (13)(B)-(C).
375. Id. § 5390(h)(13)(D).
376. Id. § 5390(h)(9).
377. Id. § 5390(h)(16)(A). The FDIC may assume an outstanding credit agreement of
the covered financial company and transfer it to a bridge financial company if that would
be less expensive than obtaining new credit for a bridge financial company. See supra note
322 and accompanying text.
378. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(h)(16)(B).
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If the bridge financial company can only obtain credit by granting
a senior or equal lien on property of the bridge financial company
that is subject to a lien, the bridge financial company may only do
so (i) upon notice and hearing before a court of the United States
that has jurisdiction to conduct such hearing, and (ii) if such
court determines "there is adequate protection of the interest of
the holder of the lien on the property with respect to which such
senior or equal lien is proposed to be granted."175 The rights of a
counterparty to a qualified financial contract may not be im-
paired by any credit or debt obtained or issued by a bridge finan-
cial company, other than the priority of any unsecured claim aris-
ing from such default relative to "the bridge financial company's
obligations in respect of such credit or debt, unless the counter-
party consents in writing to any such impairment."3 80
C. Treatment of Similarly Situated Creditors by a Bridge
Financial Company
Title II requires that the FDIC treat similarly situated credi-
tors equally when transferring the assets or liabilities of the cov-
ered financial company to a bridge financial company, subject to
substantially the same exception as that under § 5390(b)(4).38'
The FDIC may not comply with that requirement and
may take action (including making payments, subject to [the claw
back provision of] subsection (o)(1)(D)(i)), if the [FDIC] determines
that [(i)] such action is necessary (I) to maximize the value of the as-
sets of the covered financial company; (II) to maximize the present
value return from the sale or other disposition of the assets of the
379. Id. § 5390(h)(16)(C). Compare id. § 5390(h)(17) ("the reversal or modification on
appeal of an authorization .. . to obtain credit or issue debt, or of a grant ... of a priority
or a lien, does not affect the validity of any debt so issued, or any priority or lien so
granted, to an entity that extended such credit in good faith .. . unless such authorization
and the issuance of such debt, or the granting of such priority or lien, were stayed pending
appeal"), with 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (2006) (providing protection similar to that under Title II
for the validity of debt incurred and any priority or liens granted in respect of debtor in
possession financing by a lender that extended credit in good faith absent a stay pending
appeal).
380. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(h)(16)(E).
381. Compare id. § 5390(h)(5)(E) ("[AIll creditors of a covered financial company that
are similarly situated under subsection (b)(1) [shall be treated] in a similar manner."),
with id. § 5390(b)(4) ("All claimants of a covered financial company that are similarly si-
tuated under paragraph (1) shall be treated in a similar manner."). In addition, §
5390(b)(4) permits the FDIC to base its action on a determination that payment is "neces-
sary to initiate and continue operations essential to implementation of the receivership or
any bridge financial company." Id. § 5890(o)(1)(D)(i); see id. § 5390(h)(5)(E); (b)(4)(A)(ii).
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covered financial company; or (III) to minimize the amount of any
loss realized upon the sale or other disposition of the assets; and (ii)
all creditors that are similarly situated under [§ 5390(b)(1)] receive
not less than the amount
they would have received if the covered financial company had
been liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code."
D. Termination of Bridge Financial Companies
A bridge financial company will terminate at the end of two
years from the date its charter is granted, unless terminated ear-
lier pursuant to § 5390(h)(13)-(14), subject to three additional
one-year extensions, at the discretion of the FDIC as receiver."'
The bridge financial company will "terminate upon the earliest
of ... the merger or consolidation of the bridge financial company
with a company that is not a bridge financial company; ... the
sale of a majority of [its] capital stock" to a company (or eighty
percent, or more, of its capital stock to a person) other than the
FDIC or another bridge financial company, or the assumption of
all of its liabilities "by a company that is not a bridge financial
company, or the acquisition of all or substantially all of [its] as-
sets" by a company other than a bridge financial company or
"other entity permitted under applicable law."3 84 If the status of
the bridge financial company has not previously been terminated
by the transactions enumerated in § 5390(h)(13)(A), (B), (C), or
(D), it may be dissolved by the FDIC at any time.38 5 Otherwise,
the FDIC is required to promptly dissolve the bridge financial
company at the end "of the 2-year period following the date the
bridge financial company was chartered, or any extension" of
such period.386
XI. FUNDING FOR ORDERLY LIQUIDATION
Upon appointment of the FDIC as receiver, the FDIC has the
discretion to make funds available for the orderly liquidation of
the covered financial company, "subject to the conditions set forth
382. Id. § 5390(h)(5)(E).
383. Id. § 5390(h)(12).
384. Id. § 5390(h)(13)(A)-(D).
385. Id. § 5390(h)(15)(A)(i).
386. Id. § 5390(h)(15)(A)(ii).
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in section [5386] ... and subject to the [repayment] plan de-
scribed in section [5390](n)(9)."m The funds provided include
funds which may be used for:
(1) making loans to, or purchasing any debt obligation of, the covered
financial company or any covered subsidiary; (2) purchasing or gua-
ranteeing against loss the assets of the covered financial company or
any covered subsidiary, directly or through [a bridge financial com-
pany] established ... for such purpose; (3) assuming or guaranteeing
the obligations of the covered financial company or any covered sub-
sidiary to 1 or more third parties; (4) taking a lien on any or all as-
sets of the covered financial company or any covered subsidiary ...
to secure repayment of any transactions conducted [for such fund-
ing]; (5) selling or transferring all, or any part, of such acquired as-
sets, liabilities, or obligations of the covered financial company or
any covered subsidiary; and (6) making payments pursuant to [§
5390](b)(4), (d)(4), or (h)(5)(E). 8 1
All funds so provided are given priority either as administrative
expenses of the FDIC or as monies owed to the United States un-
der § 5390(b)(1)(A) or (B).389
A. Orderly Liquidation Fund
Section 5390(n)(1) provides for the establishment in the Trea-
sury of an Orderly Liquidation Fund which is to be available for
the FDIC to borrow funds to carry out its rights and duties under
Title II, "including the orderly liquidation of [the] covered finan-
cial compan[y], payment of administrative expenses, [and] the
payment of principal and interest" on obligations issued by the
FDIC as receiver to the Secretary.ase To initially fund the Orderly
Liquidation Fund, the FDIC has authority to issue obligations to
the Secretary."'
The Secretary is authorized to purchase and/or sell any obliga-
tions issued by the FDIC.112 All such purchases and sales are to
"be treated as public debt transactions of the United States."393
387. Id. § 5384(d).
388. Id.
389. Id. § 5390(b)(1)(A), (B).
390. Id. § 5390(n)(1).
391. Id. § 5390(n)(5)(A).
392. Id. § 5390(n)(5)(B), (D).
393. Id. § 5390(n)(5)(E).
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The proceeds of the sale of such obligations will "be deposited into
the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts."394
The maximum obligation that may be incurred by the FDIC for
each covered financial company may not exceed:
(A) ... 10 percent of the total consolidated assets of the covered fi-
nancial company, based on the most recent financial statement
available, during the 30-day period immediately following the .. .
appointment of the [FDIC] as receiver (or a shorter time period if the
[FDIC] has calculated the amount described under [(B)]); and
(B) ... 90 percent of the fair value of the total consolidated assets of
[the] covered financial company that are available for repayment af-
ter [such thirty-day period]."'
Calculation of the maximum obligation that may be incurred re-
quires regulatory guidance and, as provided by § 5390(n)(7), such
regulations are to be promulgated by the FDIC and the Secretary
in consultation with the Council.396
B. Orderly Liquidation and Repayment Plans
The Secretary may not provide any funding to the FDIC "un-
less an agreement is in effect between the Secretary and the
[FDIC] that ... provides a specific plan and schedule" for repay-
ment of the amount borrowed and demonstrates that the FDIC
will be able to repay the outstanding balance to the Treasury,
with interest accruing on such balance within sixty months.39 7
However, the FDIC, with the approval of the Secretary, may ex-
tend the repayment schedule if it determines the "extension is
necessary to avoid a serious adverse effect on the financial system
of the United States.""
The Orderly Liquidation Plan (the "Orderly Liquidation Plan")
outlines how funds are to be used, including under § 5384(d), §
5390(h)(2)(G)(iv) (operating funds for a bridge financial company
in lieu of capital), and § 5390(h)(9), (pertaining to funding of a
transaction that would facilitate the termination of a bridge fi-
nancial company through merger or consolidation, sale of stock,
394. Id.
395. Id. § 5390(n)(6).
396. Id. § 5390(n)(7).
397. Id. § 5390(n)(9)(A)-(B), (o)(1)(B).
398. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(C).
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assumption of all or substantially all of the liabilities of a bridge
financial company, or sale of substantially all of the assets of a
bridge financial company in each case by a company that is not a
bridge financial company, or "facilitate the acquisition by a bridge
financial company of any assets, or the assumption of any liabili-
ties, of a covered financial company") . 99
The Secretary is required to consult with, and report to, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate
and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Repre-
sentatives on the terms of any repayment schedule and provide a
report to such committees within thirty days from the date any
amount is provided through the Secretary's purchase of obliga-
tions issued by the FDIC as receiver. 400
C. Imposition of Assessment
The FDIC is required to impose risk-based assessments pur-
suant to § 5390(o), if such assessments are needed to repay the
obligations of the FDIC to the Treasury "within 60 months of the
date of issuance of [the] obligations" to the Secretary, subject to
extension, if the FDIC, with the approval of the Secretary, ex-
tends the period.40 1 The FDIC must "determine[ ] that an exten-
sion is necessary to avoid a serious adverse effect on the financial
system of the United States."402 The FDIC must first "impose as-
sessments . .. on any claimant that received additional payments
or amounts from the [FDIC] pursuant to [§ 5390](b)(4), (d)(4), or
(h)(5)(E), except for payments or amounts necessary to initiate
and continue operations essential to implementation of the recei-
vership or any bridge financial company."403 These essential pay-
ments cannot "include the provision of financing, as defined by
rule of the [FDIC], to third parties."404 The assessments must be
imposed in order to recover, on a cumulative basis, the difference
between
the aggregate value the claimant received from the [FDIC] on a
claim ... (including pursuant to [§ 5390] (b)(4), (d)(4), and (h)(5)(E)),
399. Id. § 5390(n)(9)(A), (h)(2)(G)(iv), (h)(9).
400. Id. § 5390(n)(9)(B)(i).
401. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(B)-(C).
402. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(C).
403. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i).
404. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(E).
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as of the date on which such value was received, and ... the value
the claimant was entitled to receive from the [FDIC] on such claim
solely from proceeds of the liquidation of the covered financial com-
pany under [Title II].40s
As noted above, it is unclear (i) whether the amount to be re-
couped is based upon the difference between the amount received
and the amount that would be paid on such claim in a case under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (i.e., the "Maximum Liabili-
ty")406 or (ii) whether the failure to refer to § 5390(d)(2) is meant to
require a calculation based upon the priority scheme under §
5390(b).407 However, § 5390(b) should apply since it would com-
port with the requirement in § 5390(a)(7)(B) that applies to all
unsecured creditors. 0 8
To the extent that the funds to be recovered from such creditors
are insufficient to pay in full the amount required to be paid with-
in sixty months, the FDIC, after taking into account certain risk-
based assessment considerations set forth in § 5390(o)(4),409 may
impose assessments on "(I) eligible financial companies[ ] and (II)
financial companies with total consolidated assets equal to or
greater than [$50 billion] that are not eligible financial compa-
nies."410 The term "eligible financial companies" is defined as "any
bank holding company with total consolidated assets equal to or
greater than [$50 billion] and any nonbank financial company
supervised by the [FRB] ."4 The FDIC must notify each financial
company of its assessment and the financial company must make
payment in accordance with rules adopted for such purpose. 4 12
Section 5390(o)(6) requires rulemaking by the FDIC, in consul-
tation with the Secretary, concerning assessments and provides
that the regulations so prescribed are to
take into account the differences in risks posed to the financial sta-
bility of the United States by financial companies, the differences in
the liability structures of financial companies, and the different
bases for other assessments that such financial companies may be
405. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i).
406. Id. § 5390(d)(2).
407. See id. § 5390(b).
408. See id. § 5390(a)(7)(B), (d)(2)-(3).
409. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(B), (o)(4).
410. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(D)(ii).
411. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(A).
412. Id. § 5390(o)(3), (6).
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required to pay, to ensure that assessed financial companies are
treated equitably.413
The Council must recommend a risk matrix to the FDIC and the
FDIC must take into account such recommendation in establish-
ing the risk matrix to be used in making assessments."'
XII. TIME LIMIT ON RECEIVERSHIP AUTHORITY
Section 5382(d) provides that the appointment of the FDIC as
receiver is to terminate three years after the date of its appoint-
ment.415 This time period may be extended by the FDIC for up to
one additional year if the Chairperson of the FDIC certifies in
writing to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs and House Committee on Financial Services that:
continuation of the receivership is necessary
(A) to -
(i) maximize the net present value return from the sale or oth-
er disposition of the assets of the covered financial company; or
(ii) minimize the amount of loss realized upon the sale or other
disposition of the assets of the covered financial company; and
(B) to protect the financial system of United States.416
The appointment of the FDIC may be extended for yet another
year if the Chairperson of the FDIC, with the concurrence of the
Secretary, submits the certifications required for the initial ex-
tension.417 The appointment may be extended for a second time
solely for the purpose of completing ongoing litigation in which the
[FDIC] as receiver is a party ... if (A) the Council determines that
the [FDIC] used its best efforts to conclude the receivership [within
the previously extended period, and]; (B) the Council determines
that the completion of longer-term responsibilities in the form of on-
going litigation justifies the need for an extension . . . .418
However, the FDIC's receivership must terminate within ninety
days of completion of the litigation.'1
413. Id. § 5390(o)(6).
414. Id. § 5390(o)(4).
415. Id. § 5382(d).
416. Id. § 5382(d)(1)-(2).
417. Id. § 5382(d)(2)-(3).
418. Id. § 5382(d)(4)(A)-(B).
419. Id. § 5382(d)(4).
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Other provisions may require the receivership to continue for
more than five years whether or not litigation is pending. For ex-
ample, under § 5390(o), the FDIC is to "charge one or more risk-
based assessments ... [as] necessary to pay in full the obligations
issued by the [FDIC] to the Secretary.. . within 60 months[,]"
provided that such deadline may be extended "if the [FDIC] de-
termines that an extension is necessary to avoid a serious adverse
effect on the financial system of the United States."120 As noted
above, the life of a bridge financial company may be extended for
up to a total of five years from the date of its charter which may
or may not coincide with the date of the appointment of the FDIC
as receiver. 421
XIII. TREATMENT OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND EMPLOYEES
Among the mandatory terms and conditions for all orderly li-
quidations is that the FDIC, in taking action, shall ensure that
management and members of the board of directors (or body per-
forming similar functions) "responsible for the failed condition of
the covered financial company are removed, if such members
have not already been removed at the time" of the appointment of
the FDIC as receiver.4 22 This is in contrast with Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, where the debtor in possession, through its of-
ficers, continues to operate the company and to negotiate and
conduct all sales of assets.4 23 Under the Bankruptcy Code, current
management of the debtor will continue in their positions unless
removed by the debtor's board of directors or until the bankruptcy
court determines on motion of a party in interest pursuant to §
1104 of the Bankruptcy Code that cause exists to appoint a Chap-
ter 7 or 11 trustee.424 Such cause includes "fraud, dishonesty, in-
competence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs" of the debtor
by the existing management of the debtor.42 5
420. Id. § 5390(o)(1)(B)-(C).
421. Id. § 5390(h)(12)-(13).
422. Id. § 5386(4)-(5).
423. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107-1108 (2006); id. § 1108 note (Legislative Statements) (stat-
ing that § 1107 "applies to give the debtor in possession all the rights and powers of a trus-
tee . . . under chapter 11; this includes the power of the trustee to operate the debtor's
business under [§1 1108").
424. See id. § 1104(a), (e).
425. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
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The theme of holding senior management accountable for its
acts continues in § 5390(b)(1), which effectively subordinates the
claims of senior executives and directors of the covered financial
company for "wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation,
severance, and sick leave pay earned" below the claims of general
and senior unsecured creditors and claims based on any obliga-
tions subordinated to general or senior creditors. 26 The only
claims that are lower in priority are claims for post-insolvency in-
terest test and the claims of equity holders arising out of their
ownership of equity interests. 427 The subordinated treatment of
the compensation related claims of senior executives and direc-
tors is different from equitable subordination of insider claims
under § 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code because there is no re-
quirement under Title II to show that senior executives or direc-
tors had engaged in inequitable conduct which harmed other
creditors.428 It appears that a judgment was made by Congress
that senior executives and directors should be held responsible for
the financial condition of the covered financial company whether
or not they themselves engaged in inequitable conduct.
The term "senior executive" is not defined in the Dodd-Frank
Act. In clarifying the ability of the FDIC to retain employees, but
not senior executives, under personal services agreements refe-
renced in § 5390(c)(7)(B),429 the Interim Final Rule section 380.3
defines "senior executive" as:
any person who participates or has authority to participate (other
than in the capacity of a director) in major policymaking functions of
the company, whether or not: The person has an official title; the
title designates the officer an assistant; or the person is serving
without salary or other compensation. The chairman of the board,
the president, every vice president, the secretary, and the treasurer
or chief financial officer, general partner and manager of a company
are considered executive officers, unless the person is excluded, by
resolution of the board of directors, the bylaws, the operating agree-
ment or the partnership agreement of the company, from participa-
tion (other than in the capacity of a director) in major policymaking
426. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(1)(G).
427. Id. § 5390(b)(1)(H); see also Orderly Liquidation Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324,
16,337 (proposed Mar. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
428. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 510 note (Legislative Statement) (discussing § 510(c)(1)),
with 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(b)(1)(G).
429. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c)(7)(B).
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functions of the company, and the person does not actually partici-
pate therein.430
Section 5390(s) provides for the recoupment of compensation
from senior executives and directors who are "substantially re-
sponsible" for the failure of the covered financial company. 431 The
FDIC as receiver "may recover from any current or former senior
executive or director substantially responsible for the failed con-
dition of the covered financial company any compensation re-
ceived during the 2-year period preceding" the receivership.43 2
There is no time limit for recoupment in the event of fraud. 33 The
FDIC is required to perform a cost benefit analysis in deciding
whether to facilitate such a recoupment, weighing "the financial
and deterrent benefits of such recovery against the cost of execut-
ing the recovery."4 3 4 The FDIC must prescribe regulations to im-
plement the recoupment, "including defining the term 'compensa-
tion' to mean any financial remuneration, including salary,
bonuses, incentives, benefits, severance, deferred compensation,
or golden parachute benefits, and any profits realized from the
sale of the securities of the covered financial company."43
Section 5390(f) sets forth the circumstances under which a cov-
ered financial company's directors and officers "may be held per-
sonally liable for monetary damages in any civil action. . . for
gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that
demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross
430. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4215 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 380).
431. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(s). This provision does not define the term "substantially re-
sponsible." See id. It is unclear what showing must be made to establish the degree of re-
sponsibility or whether the fact that a person was the president or chief financial officer of
the financial company is sufficient to render the person substantially responsible. Com-
pare id., with 11 U.S.C. § 548(o)(1) (permitting a trustee to avoid, among other things,
"any transfer to or for the benefit of an insider . . . under an employment contract" of an
interest of the debtor in property, or "any obligation ... incurred by the debtor, that was
made or incurred on or within 2 years before the [petition date], if the debtor voluntarily
or involuntarily . . . received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and, . . made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or
incurred such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employment contract
and not in the ordinary course of business"). See also 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B)(i)-(ii) (defin-
ing "insider" as a "director of the debtor" or an "officer of the debtor").
432. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(s)(1).
433. Id.
434. Id. § 5390(s)(2).
435. Id. § 5390(s)(3).
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negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms
are defined and determined under applicable State law."436
Such actions may be brought by, on behalf of, or at the request
of, the FDIC, acting as receiver or based on a cause of action con-
veyed by the covered financial company or its affiliate in connec-
tion with the receivership.43 7 The FDIC also retains all other
causes of action under other applicable law.43
Section 5390(g) further provides that:
[iun any proceeding related to any claim against a director, officer,
employee, agent, attorney, accountant, or appraiser of a covered fi-
nancial company, or any other party employed by or providing ser-
vices to a covered financial company, recoverable damages deter-
mined to result from the improvident or otherwise improper use or
investment of any assets of the covered financial company shall in-
clude principal losses and appropriate interest. 3 9
Regulations are necessary to clarify what the term "principal
losses" includes and how and from what date interest is to be cal-
culated (i.e., whether the applicable rate of interest is the judg-
ment rate under applicable state or federal law, or some other
rate such as the rate for post-insolvency interest, and whether in-
terest is to be computed from the date of judgment or some other
date).
Section 5390(j) provides for expedited consideration of any ap-
peals of an order entered in a case brought by the FDIC against
officers, directors, employees, or agents of a covered financial
company.440
Section 5390(r) prohibits "[p]ersons who engaged in improper
conduct with, or caused losses to [the] covered financial com-
pan[y]" from purchasing assets of the covered financial compa-
ny.m Such persons include not only any person (including any of-
ficer or director) who defaulted on obligations to the covered
financial company that exceed $1,000,000 in the aggregate, en-
gaged in fraudulent activity in connection with such obligations,
and "proposes to purchase any such asset in whole or in part [us-
436. Id. § 5390(f)(1)-(2).
437. Id. § 5390(f)(1).
438. Id. § 5390(f)(3).
439. Id. § 5390(g).
440. Id. § 5390(j)(1).
441. Id. § 5390(r)(1).
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ing] the proceeds of a loan or advance of credit from the [FDIC] or
from [the] covered financial company[,]" but also to "any person
who participated, as an officer or director of [the] covered finan-
cial company or [its affiliate], in a material way in any transac-
tion that resulted in a substantial loss to [the] covered financial
company."442 However, the provisions of § 5390(r) are not to prec-
lude
the sale or transfer by the [FDIC] of any asset of any covered finan-
cial company to any person, if the sale or transfer of the asset re-
solves or settles, or is part of the resolution or settlement, of 1 or
more claims that have been, or could have been, asserted by the
[FDIC] .
Section 5393 authorizes a ban on a senior executive or director
of the covered financial company from further participation in the
financial industry for two years or longer if the person, prior to
the appointment of the FDIC as receiver, violated, among other
things, any law, regulation, or cease-and-desist order, engaged in
"any unsafe or unsound practice in connection with any financial
company" or breached its fiduciary duty."44 A senior executive or
director may be notified via written notice from the FRB or the
FDIC (if the covered financial company was not supervised by the
FRB) of the agency's intent to ban the person from any further
participation "in the conduct of the affairs of any financial com-
pany for a period of time determined by the appropriate agency"
commensurate with the executive's or director's violation.445 The
conduct must have involved "personal dishonesty" or "demon-
strate[d] willful or continuing disregard ... for the safety or
soundness of [the financial] company."446 The violation, practice,
or breach must have contributed to the failure of the company
and the senior executive or director must have "received financial
gain or other benefit [because] of [the] violation, practice, or
breach."447
In these myriad ways, these provisions assure that the FDIC
has ample powers to hold senior executives and directors of cov-
ered financial companies accountable for the company's losses for
442. Id.
443. Id. § 5390(r)(3).
444. Id. § 5393(b)(1).
445. Id. § 5393(a), (c).
446. Id. § 5393(b)(3).
447. Id. § 5393(b)(2).
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which they are found responsible through subordination of their
claims for compensation, and actions for damages, restitution and
recoupment. 448 While a Chapter 7 trustee or a debtor in possession
in a case under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
may pursue all claims of the debtor for any fraud, misconduct, or
wrongdoing by any senior executive or director,4 9 there are no
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that expressly provide for ac-
tions against officers and directors for damages arising from such
conduct. Nor is there any ban on the right of senior executives or
directors to acquire assets of the debtor under the Bankruptcy
Code. However, under the Bankruptcy Code, any proposed trans-
action with an insider that is not in the ordinary course of busi-
ness must be approved by the bankruptcy court after providing
notice to all creditors and other parties in interest and a hear-
ing.450
XIV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF TITLE I TO TITLE II
Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act ("Title I") provides tools by which
the FDIC may prepare for the orderly liquidation of a systemical-
ly important financial company if the financial condition of such
financial company deteriorates to the point that it presents risk
to the financial stability of the United States.
Section 172 of Title I amended § 1820 of the FDIA to provide
for enhanced supervision and prudential standards for nonbank
financial companies supervised by the FRB and bank holding
companies with at least $50 billion in assets."1 Most significant
for Title II is the requirement that such financial companies pe-
riodically provide to the FRB, the Council, and the FDIC the reso-
lution plan of such company for its orderly liquidation in the
event of material financial distress or failure.45 2 Section 5365(d)
outlines information which must be provided in the resolution
plans, including "full descriptions of the ownership structure, as-
448. Id. § 5384(a)(3).
449. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006).
450. Id. § 363(b).
451. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1820.
452. Id. § 5365(d)(1)-(2). These resolution plans, often referred to as "living wills," pro-
vide a roadmap for the orderly liquidation of a financial company. See Implementing Cer-
tain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,176 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
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sets, liabilities and contractual obligations of the [financial] com-
pany." 63 The resolution plan of a covered financial company
should, therefore, provide the FDIC with the information needed
to make prompt determinations in advance of its appointment as
receiver of a covered financial company with respect to the opera-
tions or assets that should be transferred to one or more bridge
financial companies to continue systemically important opera-
tions and allow for an orderly liquidation of assets that maximiz-
es recoveries and minimizes losses.454
The resolution plan would also provide information concerning
qualified financial contracts and other contracts that could be ei-
ther transferred to and assumed by a bridge financial company or
sold to a third party.455 The information provided would also assist
the FDIC in identifying appropriate acquirers of essential opera-
tions of systemically important financial companies so that the
sale of assets of a covered financial company might be effected in
a prompt and nondisruptive manner, much as transfers of opera-
tions of insured depository institutions are effected under the
FDIA.456 In addition, § 1820 of the FDIA, as amended by § 172 of
Title I, provides the FDIC with backup examination authority if
the board of directors of the FDIC determines that a special ex-
amination is necessary for the purpose of implementing the
FDIC's orderly liquidation authority to assist it in preparing for
the resolution process. 457
XV. CONCLUSION
A review of the orderly liquidation authority under Title II as
compared to a liquidation under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code is a study in contrasts resulting from the
different goals and purposes of the two statutes. The purpose of
the Bankruptcy Code is to maximize recoveries to creditors and
other stakeholders, while a primary purpose of Title II is to avoid
a disorderly liquidation that could have an adverse effect on the
financial stability of the United States. As a result of these differ-
ent goals, Title II will likely have a profound effect on the rights
453. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5365(d)(1)(B).
454. See Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions, 75 Red. Reg. at 64,175-76.
455. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5365(d)(1).
456. See Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177.
457. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1820(b)(3)(A).
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of creditors, other stakeholders, and the debtor itself as they exist
under the Bankruptcy Code. Title II evidences Congress's keen
awareness of this issue, since Title II specifically provides for the
study of both the Bankruptcy Code and Title II to determine
whether amendments to the Bankruptcy Code (as well as the
FDIA and other insolvency laws) could effectively address many
of the concerns with respect to the effect the liquidation of sys-
temically important financial companies on the financial stability
of the United States without abandoning significant rights of
creditors and other stakeholders under the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 216 of Title II calls for the FRB, in consultation with
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to conduct
a study regarding the resolution of financial companies under
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 45 8 The issues
to be studied are:
(A) the effectiveness of chapter 7 and chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code in facilitating the orderly resolution or reorganization of sys-
temic financial companies;
(B) whether a special financial resolution court or panel of special
masters or judges should be established to oversee cases involving
financial companies to provide for the resolution of such companies
under the Bankruptcy Code ... ;
(C) whether amendments to the Bankruptcy Code should be adopted
to enhance the ability of the Code to resolve financial companies in a
manner that minimizes adverse impacts on financial markets with-
out creating moral hazard;
(D) whether amendments should be made to the Bankruptcy Code,
the [FDIA], and other insolvency laws to address the manner in
which qualified financial contracts of financial companies are
treated; and
(E) the implications, challenges, and benefits to creating a new chap-
ter or subchapter of the Bankruptcy Code should be created to deal
with financial companies.4 5 9
Section 5382(e) directs the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts and the Comptroller General of the United States
to monitor activities of the District Court (presumably in connec-
458. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 216, 124 Stat. 1376, 1519 (2010).
459. Id. Section 216(b) requires that the report be submitted to the Committees on
Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committees
on Financial Services and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives (the "Congres-
sional Committees") summarizing such studies "[n]ot later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of the [Dodd-Frank] Act, and in each successive year until the fifth year after
the date of enactment of [the Dodd-Frank] Act." Id.
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tion with any future application by the Secretary for liquidation
of a systemically important financial company under Title II) and
to conduct separate studies regarding the bankruptcy and orderly
liquidation process for financial companies eligible to be a debtor
under the Bankruptcy Code, including "(i) the effectiveness of
chapter 7 or chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in facilitating the
orderly liquidation or reorganization of financial companies ...
[and (ii)] ways to make the orderly liquidation process under the
Bankruptcy Code for financial companies more effective."460
Of the issues identified for study, some appear relatively sim-
ple to address. One could envision an amendment to the Bank-
ruptcy Code that provides for a suspension of the rights of early
termination and close-out netting under qualified financial con-
tracts for one business day following the filing of a case under
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of a systemically
important financial company so that the FDIC or other appropri-
ate regulatory body could propose the transfer of such contracts
to a third party. Other issues are more difficult to address, such
as the role a bridge financial company might play in the context
of a case under the Bankruptcy Code and how that entity might
be funded. Ultimately, these studies may result in finding a mid-
dle ground that would preserve the rights of creditors and other
stakeholders under the Bankruptcy Code, while providing greater
certainty that the resolution process under the Bankruptcy Code
would not adversely affect the financial stability of the United
States, thereby obviating the need for governmental bailouts.
The issues outlined above are worthy of study, but at least for
the immediate future the focus must be on Title II itself and on
the regulations that will clarify and implement its provisions so
that creditors and other stakeholders can understand the impli-
cations of a determination by the Secretary that a financial com-
pany eligible to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code should
instead be liquidated under Title II.
460. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5382(e). Section 5382(e) also calls for periodic reports to the Con-
gressional Committees within one year after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and
annually thereafter for two years, followed by a report every fifth year after the date of
enactment. Id.
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